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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
The Role of the U.S. Courts of Appeals in Legal Development:
An Empirical Analysis
by
Rachael K. Hinkle
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
Washington University in St. Louis, 2013
James F. Spriggs II and Andrew D. Martin, Chairs
What are the causes and consequences of legal development? In recent years courts
scholars have begun to address these broad and challenging questions, yet there is
still much work to be done. The intermediate level of the federal court system (a.k.a.,
circuit courts) provides an institutional context replete with opportunities to extend
our theoretical and empirical understanding of legal development. My dissertation
takes advantage of these opportunities in three ways. First, I explore legal constraint
by comparing citation to and treatment of circuit court precedents. A precedent is
binding in its own circuit, but merely persuasive in other circuits. Consequently,
if law constrains judges the effect of ideology on how a precedent is treated should
be significantly less when it is considered in its own circuit than when considered
by a sister circuit. Second, I investigate the nuances of a circuit’s citation to its
own binding precedent to determine how it is influenced by strategic anticipation of
whether a case will be reviewed and overturned by the entire circuit. Third, I examine
the impact of federal courts on state policy diffusion, positing that both adoption and
content of a policy will be influenced by federal court rulings on the constitutionality
of a previously adopted statute.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
For decades, political scientists who study courts have focused on the effect personal ideology has on judicial decisionmaking (e.g., Segal and Spaeth, 2002; Brace,
Langer and Hall, 2000; Segal and Cover, 1989; Pritchett, 1968; Schubert, 1965). However, more recently, increasing attention has been paid to incorporating the effect of
law into models of judicial behavior (e.g., Bartels, 2009; Hansford and Spriggs, 2006;
Lindquist and Klein, 2006; Richards and Kritzer, 2002). These efforts to “take law
seriously”1 involve exploring both what drives legal development and the changes effected by it. This project takes up these important questions in the context of the
U.S. Courts of Appeals.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court receives the lion’s share of attention from political scientists, the vast majority of precedential federal case law is produced by
the intermediate courts of appeals (Cross, 2007; Hettinger, Lindquist and Martinek,
2006; Klein, 2002; Songer, Sheehan and Haire, 2000). If taking law seriously is important, then taking the federal circuit courts seriously is crucial as well. In addition
1

Friedman (2006) criticizes political scientists for not taking law seriously.

1

to being an essential object of study in their own right, the institutional structure
of circuit courts is particularly conducive to exploring legal development. Both the
development of different legal rules in different circuits and the geographic grouping of contiguous states into federal circuits offer opportunities to gain leverage on
interesting questions.
The U.S. Courts of Appeals, like many entities, produce a prodigious amount of
textual data every year. The bulk of empirical scholarship on courts has focused on
the outcomes of cases rather than the content of the opinions judges write. Although
this standard approach has resulted in many important discoveries, several scholars
have urged moving beyond this focus solely on case outcomes (Hume, 2006, 2009a,b;
Friedman, 2006; Edwards, 1998). Technology is increasingly making this move possible by enabling automated extraction of information from the content of opinions
which is complemented by human coding rather than solely relying on the latter (e.g.,
see Corley, Collins and Calvin, 2011; Corley, 2008). This dissertation takes advantage
of such technology to glean important information about legal development from the
text of relevant documents.
In the following three chapters I explore the causes and consequences of legal
development in three specific areas: the incorporation of non-binding out-of-circuit
precedent into the law of a sister circuit, the anticipation of en banc review within a
circuit, and the adoption and drafting of state legislation. The first of these topics
offers the opportunity to provide empirical evidence of legal constraint on judges’
decisions2 by contrasting the effect of non-binding precedent (from another circuit)
with the effect of binding precedent. The second topic sheds light on the role of
2

To date, such evidence has proved to be quite elusive (Lax and Rader, 2010; Friedman and
Martin, 2011), although some clever approaches have been developed (Bartels, 2009; Black and
Owens, 2009; Bailey and Maltzman, 2008; Hansford and Spriggs, 2006; Lindquist and Klein, 2006;
Richards and Kritzer, 2002).

2

strategic behavior of a panel vis-a-vis the ideological makeup of the whole circuit.
While the broader topic of strategic judicial behavior has been widely explored (e.g.,
Scott, 2006; Klein and Hume, 2003; Songer, Ginn and Sarver, 2003; Maltzman, Spriggs
and Wahlbeck, 2000; Epstein and Knight, 1998), a circuit panel’s anticipation of en
banc review has yet to be examined in detail. Finally, the third topic builds on
the literature exploring policy diffusion. Scholars have long noted that in deciding
whether to adopt a new policy, states tend to be influenced by their neighboring states
(Allen, Pettus and Haider-Markel, 2004; Andrews, 2000; Mooney and Lee, 1995; Berry
and Berry, 1990; Gray, 1973; Walker, 1969). This study suggests a mechanism that
helps explain such a phenomenon by positing that states consider how the federal
courts–especially in their own circuit–have treated policies adopted by other states.

3

Chapter 2
Legal Constraint

Backgrounds will vary, attitudes will differ, environments will change, but
the law remains the alpha and omega of judicial decisionmaking.

-Sisk, Heise and Morriss, 1998: 1500
To most people, the claim that law is central to judicial decisionmaking hardly
seems controversial. The concept that the primary responsibility of judges is to neutrally apply existing law to specific factual situations is foundational in our legal
system. Judges are expected to create new rules only where necessary. Once a new
rule is established, the doctrine of stare decisis constrains future judges from the same
court and lower courts to follow that precedent (Aldisert, 1989; Boyd and Spriggs,
2009). Yet this picture of how law develops is somewhat at odds with the picture
painted by existing empirical scholarship. Within the body of empirical work on judicial behavior, one of the most consistently observed factors has not been law, but
a judge’s ideology. Nevertheless, the considerable evidence that judges act ideologi4

cally does not necessarily mean that law does not matter. This chapter will provide
evidence of both factors working in tandem.
Finding unequivocal evidence of legal constraint is not a simple task. Differentiating between conduct based on ideology and legal doctrine in a field which entails
exercise of considerable discretion is difficult (Cross et al., 2010; Kim, 2006). The
challenges are further compounded when searching for legal constraint in the U.S.
Supreme Court because that is the institutional context where it is least likely to
exist (Friedman and Martin, 2011). Supreme Court justices face few disincentives for
acting ideologically, and the nature of their caseload (composed of both novel and
important legal issues) lends itself to ideological decisionmaking (Cross et al., 2010).
Although the U.S. Supreme Court receives the lion’s share of attention from political scientists who study courts, the vast majority of federal case law is produced by
the intermediate courts of appeals (Boyd and Spriggs, 2009; Cross, 2007; Hettinger,
Lindquist and Martinek, 2006; Klein, 2002; Songer, Sheehan and Haire, 2000). Cross
(2003) has noted that circuit court decisions “are probably the decisions of greatest
importance for the development of the law in the United States” (Cross, 2003: 1459).
Since these courts both exercise broad power and are held responsible by a higher
level of judicial hierarchy, they present an excellent forum for examining the extent
to which legal constraint influences the development of law. There is reason to expect
that judges might be constrained by stare decisis, and learning about such constraint
is important for understanding a set of courts which has a substantial impact on the
legal landscape.
While the circuit courts are ripe for examination of the impact of law on judicial
decisionmaking, the challenges inherent in such a task remain. One difficulty lies in
objectively identifying what the law is or what result the law requires in order to
compare judges’ behavior to that standard. Another serious difficulty is addressing
5

the endogeneity concerns raised since the law in question is usually judge-made law.
Distinguishing between the effect of law and the effect of factors influencing judges
similarly at two different times is not a simple matter. While scholars have crafted
insightful and creative techniques designed to tease out empirical evidence of legal
doctrine influencing judges, much work remains to be done in this area.
My contribution in this paper is identifying an opportunity provided by the institutional structure of federal circuit courts which ameliorates endogeneity concerns
in a novel way. Circuit courts dispose of the vast majority of their caseload using
panels composed of three judges (Collins and Martinek, 2011; Kim, 2009).1 In these
courts a published2 opinion (hereinafter “precedent”) is binding for panels within its
own circuit, but only persuasive3 in other circuits (Cross, 2003; Klein, 2002; Landes,
Lessig and Solimine, 1998; Merritt, 1990). If judges are constrained by the doctrine
of stare decisis, ideology should have a reduced impact on whether they cite a binding
precedent compared to a persuasive precedent. Furthermore, the decision to negatively or positively treat a cited precedent should also be influenced by whether the
precedent is binding. The fact that every precedent is binding in some circumstances
and not in others mitigates concerns traditionally associated with empirical tests of
legal constraint.
1

After a panel rules, the losing party may request that the entire circuit rehear the case in an en
banc proceeding, but such petitions are granted only rarely (Choi, Gulati and Posner, 2012; Kim,
2009; Giles et al., 2007; Law, 2004; George and Solimine, 2001; Van Winkle, 1997; Posner, 2000).
2

Because federal litigants have a right to appeal at least once (Boyd and Spriggs, 2009), federal
circuit courts resolve a considerable number of routine cases each year in addition to their important
policymaking role. For the sake of efficiency, many of these cases are dispatched with “unpublished”
opinions. Although the name is a bit of a misnomer since such opinions are available online now, the
distinction is important because most circuits do not recognize unpublished precedents as binding.
3

”[J]udges are under no obligation to follow persuasive authority. . . .” (Aldisert, 1989: 632)

6

Many scholars have noted that citation analysis can be an invaluable tool to
explore a variety of interesting questions (Caldeira, 1985; Hume, 2009b; Landes, Lessig
and Solimine, 1998; Posner, 1999). This paper continues that tradition by utilizing
citation patterns in the U.S. Courts of Appeals to scrutinize the effect of stare decisis
on judicial behavior. I have constructed an expansive new dataset containing all
search and seizure precedents published by circuit courts from 1953 to 2010. Using
this comprehensive list of possible cases a judge might cite, I analyze the citation
and treatment decisions of judges from 2000 to 2010 and provide evidence that the
doctrine of stare decisis does constrain judicial behavior. Judges are significantly less
ideological when deciding whether to cite binding precedents than when deciding to
cite persuasive precedents, and they are consistently less likely to negatively treat
binding precedents.

2.1

Ubiquitous yet Elusive: The Paradox of Law

How does law influence judges? This basic question is at the heart of studying
judicial behavior and decisionmaking. The classical view that judges apply the law
to facts in an objective and impartial manner has been called into question since the
advent of the Legal Realist movement in the 1920’s. The Legal Realists’ attribution of judicial decisions to judge-specific factors other than law (such as a judge’s
culinary choices) launched the examination of extralegal factors in decisionmaking
(Bailey and Maltzman, 2011; Duxbury, 1995). For decades, the field of political
science has focused on the effect personal ideology (and, later, strategic pursuit of
ideological preferences) has on judicial decisionmaking (e.g., Brace, Langer and Hall,
2000; Goldman, 1966, 1975; Pritchett, 1941, 1968; Revesz, 1997; Rowland and Carp,
1980; Schubert, 1965; Segal and Cover, 1989; Segal and Spaeth, 2002). More recently,
7

judicial scholars have turned their attention to the complexity of judges’ behavior,
recognizing that it is most likely influenced by different types of factors, including,
at least under some circumstances, the existing state of the law (Cross, 2003; George
and Epstein, 1992; Gibson, 1983; Kim, 2006). Consequently, scholars have paid increasing attention to incorporating the effect of law into models of judicial behavior
(Bartels, 2009; Bailey and Maltzman, 2008, 2011; Black and Owens, 2009; Hansford
and Spriggs, 2006; Kritzer and Richards, 2003, 2005; Lindquist and Klein, 2006; Luse
et al., 2009; Richards and Kritzer, 2002; Richards, Smith and Kritzer, 2006; Songer
and Sheehan, 1992).
Scholars have developed a variety of methods to examine the question of whether
law influences judicial decisionmaking. Since legal rules involve mapping case facts to
appropriate outcomes, one of the earliest approaches was fact pattern analysis. There
is evidence that different facts lead to different outcomes in search and seizure (Segal,
1984) and death penalty cases (George and Epstein, 1992; Traut and Emmert, 1998).
Segal and Spaeth examine the voting patterns of justices who dissented in landmark
cases and point to their disinclination to change votes in later similar cases as evidence
that law does not constrain (Segal and Spaeth, 1996, 2002). The work of Richards
and Kritzer operates by identifying a key regime change in the Supreme Court and
evaluating judicial behavior before and after the change (Richards and Kritzer, 2002;
Richards, Smith and Kritzer, 2006; Kritzer and Richards, 2005, 2003). They find
that the changes in legal rules they study do affect case outcomes (Richards and
Kritzer, 2002; Richards, Smith and Kritzer, 2006; Kritzer and Richards, 2005, 2003).
Luse, et. al. (2009) find that circuit judges similarly respond to new jurisprudential
regimes established by the Supreme Court. Bailey and Maltzman (2011) approach
the question of legal constraint by comparing actions of Supreme Court justices to
those of political actors from other branches who are unhampered by the doctrine of
8

stare decisis. They also find some evidence of legal constraint (Bailey and Maltzman,
2011). Other scholars have pointed to different outcomes in cases which apply different
legal standards (Bartels, 2009; Cross, 2003), higher win rates in cases with better
quality legal arguments (Lindquist and Klein, 2006), and reliance on jurisprudential
considerations in agenda-setting decisions (Black and Owens, 2009) as evidence that
judges are influenced by law.
Many of these studies, while ingenious and innovative, are also subject to important critiques or limitations. For example, the work of Richards and Kritzer has been
called into question on methodological grounds and only some of their findings hold
up under scrutiny (Pang et al., 2012; Lax and Rader, 2010). The broader concern
with studies of legal constraint, however, is the endogeneity of measures of law since
law is often created by judges. Consequently, it is particularly challenging to distinguish the effect of law itself from the effect of some unobserved factor influencing
both the judges who originally formulated the law and later judges. As a result of this
conundrum, solid empirical evidence of law constraining judicial behavior has proved
elusive.
The extant work on legal constraint is somewhat limited by the fact that most of
it has been done at the Supreme Court level and on relatively small groups of cases.
While this does not diminish the importance of the insights these studies offer, it does
raise obstacles to extending both the conclusions and research techniques to other
forums. Nevertheless, the results are suggestive since the Supreme Court is the forum
where law would be least likely to constrain judges. Judges with a life appointment to
a court of last resort face significantly less pressure than their counterparts who face
reversal and whose rulings may have career implications (Boyd and Spriggs, 2009;
Caminker, 1994; Friedman, 2006; Hettinger, Lindquist and Martinek, 2006). The
institutional characteristics of the Supreme Court may very well explain the difficulty
9

scholars have had identifying clear empirical evidence of the impact of law on judicial
behavior (Friedman and Martin, 2011). As Friedman (2006) points out, “if constraint
is the issue, all the important action might be in the lower courts” (Friedman, 2006:
265).
Within the federal court system, the effect of law is probably most constraining
for trial court judges. Litigants have a right to appeal which makes the possibility
of reversal ever-present (Haire, Lindquist and Songer, 2003; Randazzo, 2008). In addition, the possibility of a judge being promoted to a higher court is quite realistic
which provides additional incentive to conform with norms regarding neutral application of law (Haire, Lindquist and Songer, 2003; Morriss, Heise and Sisk, 2005; Sisk,
Heise and Morriss, 1998). However, while these judges have considerable influence
over numerous litigants and their individual disputes, broader policymaking power is
typically reserved to the appellate courts (Kim, 2006). Federal trial judges’ opinions
do not constitute binding precedent,4 and a considerable proportion of their efforts
are devoted to matters which are case-specific (Rowland and Carp, 1996).
In between the two extremes of the Supreme Court and trial courts lie the intermediate courts of appeals. The federal circuit courts dispose of many routine matters,
but they are also responsible for settling a wide range of legal disputes which have
broad policy implications, yet may never be addressed by the Supreme Court (Cross,
2003, 2000; George, 1997; Hettinger, Lindquist and Martinek, 2006). These significant rulings are set forth in published opinions which are legally binding across all
states in the circuit. This broad policy power is balanced by the possibility of reversal by the circuit as a whole (en banc) or by the Supreme Court (Hellman, 2007;
4

In the federal court system, the opinions of district court judges are not binding even within the
same district. While the reasoning may be persuasive, legal doctrine does not require subsequent
judges to apply such precedent See 18-134 Moore’s Federal Practice - Civil §134.02(d).

10

Revesz, 1997). The threat of reversal–although small–may still result in the doctrine
of stare decisis circumscribing judges’ behavior. Moreover, judges may act within
the constraints of legal doctrine for other reasons such as preserving legitimacy or
normative beliefs regarding appropriate judicial conduct (Cross et al., 2010; Hansford and Spriggs, 2006; Kim, 2006; McNollgast, 1995). Studies have shown a high
degree of compliance with Supreme Court doctrine by federal circuit courts (Benesh
and Reddick, 2002; Gruhl, 1980; Songer and Haire, 1992; Johnson, 1987; Klein and
Hume, 2003; Songer, Segal and Cameron, 1994). In sum, the circuit courts offer a
context where law may very well operate as a constraint on the behavior of judges
who are significant policymakers.
However, the extent, and even existence, of the effect of law in the circuit courts is
far from certain. The possibility of reversal either en banc or by the Supreme Court
is quite remote in any given case (Cross and Tiller, 1998). Circuit judges have lifetime tenure and a very low probability of promotion. Klein and Hume (2003) found
that a greater possibility of reversal by the Supreme Court was actually related to
lower levels of circuit court compliance. Just as with Supreme Court justices, there is
considerable empirical evidence that circuit judges’ ideology influences their decisionmaking (Goldman, 1975, 1966; Haire, Lindquist and Songer, 2003; Haire, Hartley and
Lindquist, 1999; Songer and Haire, 1992; Hettinger, Lindquist and Martinek, 2004;
Revesz, 1997; Schubert, 1965; Segal and Spaeth, 2002; Songer, Sheehan and Haire,
1999; Songer, Segal and Cameron, 1994; Songer and Davis, 1990; Sunstein, 2006; Sunstein, Schkade and Ellman, 2004). The challenge taken up here is to examine whether,
how, and under what circumstances the legal doctrine of stare decisis moderates the
well-documented ideological effect.
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2.2

Disentangling Law and Ideology

Searching for convincing evidence that judges’ behavior is shaped by legal principles is complicated. There is a strong professional and societal expectation that
judges rely on the law to make their decisions, so judges have a powerful motivation
to write their opinions and describe their behavior as if they are doing exactly that
(Cross, 2003; Gillman, 2001). Moreover, determining what the law “requires” (as an
objective matter) is virtually impossible. Consequently, judges’ actions cannot simply be compared to the legally “correct” result in a particular case. The problem of
observational equivalence between different motives creates further complications. A
liberal judge might reach a liberal result for either ideological or legal reasons (or some
combination). As a result, judicial scholars are faced with the challenge of identifying
creative ways to examine whether, and to what extent, law constrains judges.
One way to overcome these challenges is to identify a situation where quasicounterfactual data are available. In the courts of appeals, institutional rules and the
legal doctrine of stare decisis provide the opportunity to examine counterfactual-type
data with respect to citation behavior. Published circuit court opinions are binding
in their own circuit,5 but only persuasive in other circuits (Cross, 2003; Klein, 2002;
Landes, Lessig and Solimine, 1998; Lee III, 2003; Lindquist and Cross, 2005; Merritt,
1990; O’Hara, 1993). As a result, a particular precedent is binding in some circumstances, but not in others. A judge considering a precedent must make two decisions:
first, should the precedent be cited at all?, and second, if it is cited should it be
treated negatively, neutrally, or positively?6 To the extent that legal doctrine influ5

As a general rule, three-judge panels are not permitted to overturn previous circuit decisions
(Hellman, 2007).
6

Following Hansford and Spriggs (2006) I refer to the case where a judge is making these decisions
as a treatment case to distinguish it from a precedent.
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ences judges’ behavior, the answers to both of those questions should be conditional
on whether the precedent is binding.
The novel contribution of studying citation to circuit precedents lies in the fact
that each precedent is binding for some judges and persuasive for others. Comparing
citation to two separate groups of precedent, one which is always binding and another
which is always persuasive, would raise endogeneity concerns about unmeasured differences between the two types of cases. Such concerns are substantially ameliorated
when we can observe how judges treat every precedent under two different conditions.
For the set of judges in the same circuit we have data to answer the question, How
will a judge cite/treat this precedent when required by law to follow it? For the set
of judges in other circuits we have data to answer the question, How will a judge
cite/treat this precedent when its authority is only persuasive? The discrepancy between these two responses provides insight into the extent to which law constrains
circuit judges’ citation behavior (assuming other relevant factors are appropriately
controlled).
Citation analysis has the potential to shed important light on how law develops
(Boyd and Spriggs, 2009; Choi, Gulati and Posner, 2012; Cross et al., 2010; Hansford and Spriggs, 2006; Landes, Lessig and Solimine, 1998; Posner, 1999; Spriggs and
Hansford, 2002; Walsh, 1997; Wedeking, 2012). Looking at citations is a step towards
focusing on both the content of judicial opinions and the dynamic nature of law. Although a focus on case outcomes has driven courts scholars for several decades and
has resulted in many important discoveries, there is additional information available
to us as well. Many scholars have urged moving beyond this focus solely on case
outcomes (Edwards, 1998; Friedman, 2006; Hume, 2006, 2009a,b; Lax, 2012). Technology is increasingly making this move possible by enabling automated extraction
of information from the content of opinions which is complemented by human coding
13

rather than solely relying on the latter (e.g., see Corley, Collins and Calvin, 2011;
Corley, 2008). One essential piece of information from the text of a judicial opinion
is which legal precedents are cited and how they are treated. This information is
especially important when the question of interest is how judges are influenced by
law. As a result, citation analysis in the circuit courts is a fruitful new area to study,
not only because institutional rules provide a convenient counterfactual, but because
this mode of analysis also allows us to get at the heart of judicial lawmaking.

2.3

Exploring Citation Behavior

In the course of crafting an opinion, a judge must make two decisions about each
precedent which might potentially be included. First, will the precedent be cited?
Second, if the precedent is cited, will it be treated negatively, neutrally,7 or positively
(Hazelton, Hinkle and Spriggs, 2011)? Previous research has established that several
factors influence such decisions including the ideological similarity between the judge
and a precedent (Benjamin and Desmarais, 2012; Hansford and Spriggs, 2006; Hazelton, Hinkle and Spriggs, 2011; Johnson, 1987; Spriggs and Hansford, 2002; Westerland
et al., 2010). This paper builds on existing citation research by introducing the additional variable of whether a precedent is binding or persuasive and examining how
the effect of ideology is conditioned by the doctrinal status of a precedent.
The doctrine of stare decisis requires citation and application of relevant binding
precedents while no such requirement exists for persuasive precedents. Consequently,
binding precedents should be more likely to be cited than persuasive precedents, and
7

As a practical matter a neutral citation to a precedent can be understood as a soft positive
treatment. While the signal may not be quite as emphatic as an explicitly positive treatment, it is
in the same direction.
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cited binding precedents should be more likely to be treated positively. However,
such patterns do not necessarily indicate compliance with legal doctrine. There are
also other reasons why binding precedents might be cited or positively treated more.
Policy-minded judges may prefer to discuss binding precedents since they provide an
opportunity to more directly shape the law of the circuit. Furthermore, there is often
a lower cost associated with incorporating binding precedents in an opinion. Cases
from other circuits are less likely to be previously known to a judge or brought to
their attention by counsel. With computerized legal research, finding cases from other
circuits is certainly possible, but it takes time and effort to locate such cases.8
Consider these factors in terms of the utility a judge gains from citing a case.
u(Citation) = Legal Constraint + P olicy − Cost
Each of the factors on the right side potentially has a different impact on the utility
of citation depending on whether a precedent is binding or persuasive. As discussed
above, judges gain more utility from shaping the law in their own circuit by discussing
their own cases.
P olicyB > P olicyP
The subscript denotes whether a precedent is binding or persuasive. The cost of
becoming aware of a precedent is higher when it is from another circuit.
CostB < CostP
If judges are constrained by stare decisis that effect would increase the utility of citing
a binding precedent, but would have no similar effect for persuasive precedents. So
a higher probability of citing binding precedents is a necessary condition for finding
8

Paradoxically, the considerable growth of the number of cases available electronically can ultimately increase the amount of effort needed to sort through the available opinions.
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evidence of legal constraint. However, both P olicy and Cost also increase the utility
of citing a binding precedent relative to citing a persuasive precedent. This means
that it is possible to observe the expected pattern of more frequent citation to binding
precedents even if legal constraint has zero effect. As a result, a higher rate of citation
to binding precedents is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for legal constraint.
A very similar analysis applies to the utility of positively treating a cited precedent
with the minor exception that the Cost factor is no longer different. Once a precedent
is cited, the cost of treating that precedent should be similar regardless of whether
it is from that same circuit or a different circuit. The remainder of the analysis
and the conclusion remain the same; a higher rate of positive treatment of binding
precedents is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for establishing the existence
of legal constraint.
The role of legal constraint in the decision to negatively treat a cited precedent is
markedly different even though the utility function is similar.
u(N egativeT reatment) = Legal Constraint + P olicy − Cost
As discussed regarding positive treatment, the Cost factor should not differ for binding and persuasive precedents. However, I still expect judges to gain more utility
from discussing precedents from their own circuit, even when the discussion constitutes negative treatment because it shapes the development of the law. The key
difference stems from the different expectations regarding legal constraint. If law
constrains judges, they will gain less utility from negatively treating a binding precedent.9 The observable effect of legal constraint would be to decrease the probability
9

I do not claim that legal doctrine precludes all negative treatment. A judge can cite a similar
case and distinguish it from the case at bar without violating stare decisis. Therefore, a certain
baseline amount of negative treatment is expected even where judges are constrained by law (Lee III,
2003). However, when no such constraint exists, judges are free to negatively treat a precedent on
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of negative treatment. Maximizing policy influence would result in the opposite pattern. Consequently, a lower rate of negative treatment of binding precedents is both
a necessary and sufficient condition for evidence of legal constraint.
Scholars have demonstrated that ideological distance between a court and a precedent influences citation and treatment of that precedent (Hansford and Spriggs, 2006;
Johnson, 1987; Spriggs and Hansford, 2002). This relationship is attributed to the
long-recognized impact ideological preferences have on judicial decisionmaking. While
the impact of ideology on citation and treatment may be different in size, the expectations are similar in terms of direction. An authoring judge is more likely to cite
and positively treat a precedent that is ideologically proximate and more likely not
to cite or negatively treat a precedent that is ideologically distant. Consequently, I
hypothesize that an increase in ideological distance should decrease the probability
of both citation and positive treatment while increasing the probability of negative
treatment.
In addition to the effects of ideology and the doctrinal status of a precedent being
interesting in their own right, the interaction between the two provides key insight.
The idea that law constrains judges simply means that they act differently–i.e., less
ideologically–than they would in the absence of legal doctrine mandating adherence to
binding precedents. Legal constraint does not mean that the effect of ideology must be
wiped out completely or that there will be perfect compliance (Lee III, 2003). Judging
is a process which necessarily includes discretion (Cross et al., 2010; Kim, 2006). It
is impractical to expect such discretion will be exercised without being influenced
(however subconsciously) by ideology. Legal constraint need not be absolute in order
to be important and interesting. Simply put, “[t]aking legal rules seriously need
ideological grounds as well as legal grounds which would result in a higher overall incidence of
negative treatment.
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not require jettisoning notions of ideological preferences . . . ” (Lax, 2007: 600). I
hypothesize that, to the extent law constrains judges, ideology will have a reduced
impact on citation and treatment decisions when a precedent is binding. Figure 2.1
depicts this and the forgoing hypotheses graphically.
While the central focus of this paper is examining the extent to which the doctrinal status of a precedent constrains citation and treatment decisions, it is, of course,
important to account for other factors which might also influence these decisions
and may be correlated with the primary variables of interest. Some of these factors
influence both citation and treatment, while others primarily bear on the decision
regarding whether to cite a case. For both the citation and treatment decisions, I
control for case similarity, whether the precedent was written by the authoring judge
in the treatment case, whether a precedent had a dissenting opinion, whether a precedent was signed, whether a precedent was decided en banc, vitality of a precedent,
the number of previous citations to a precedent (by a circuit court), the number of
previous treatments of a precedent (by a circuit court), age of a precedent, length of
a precedent (logged number of words), length of the treatment case (logged number
of words), and the quality of the legal analysis in a precedent. The control variables
which only effect citation, and not treatment, are the number of available binding
precedents (logged) and the workload of the deciding court.

2.4

Data and Research Design

Since my focus is to model the decisions of whether and how precedents are cited,
it is necessary to identify not only a set of treatment cases to study, but also the
relevant choice set of potentially applicable precedents which a panel may choose
to cite in a treatment case. Nibblett (2010) conducts such an analysis by isolating
18
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of Hypotheses: These graphs depict the general expectations of what the empirical results should look like if the legal doctrine of
stare decisis constrains circuit judges.

all California appeals cases which ruled on the issue of the unconscionability of an
arbitration clause in a form contract. I take a similar approach, but cast a wider
net. The federal circuit courts generate a prodigious number of published opinions
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each year, especially compared to the Supreme Court. My strategy is to focus on
a subset of cases by selecting one particular issue area: Fourth Amendment search
and seizure cases. This topic is well-suited to this context because it incorporates
a discrete set of legal issues which are routinely raised in litigation.10 Moreover,
the bulk of search and seizure cases has been litigated since the early 1950’s. This
pattern is illustrated in Figure 2.2 by plotting the appearance of the phrase “Fourth
Amendment” in Supreme Court cases. In the circuit courts there is a similar dearth of
Fourth Amendment cases before the 1950’s. Such timing is key because the measure
of judicial ideology employed here is not widely available for cases decided before
1953. Therefore, search and seizure provides an area of law where it is possible to
incorporate almost the entire body of circuit precedent within the scope of the study.

1953

20
10
0

Raw Count

30

Number of Times 'Fourth Amendment'
Appears in S.Ct. Cases by Year (1791−2005)

1800

1850

1900

1950

2000

Year

Figure 2.2: The Emergence of Fourth Amendment Litigation: This plot
tracks the raw number of time the phrase “Fourth Amendment” appears
in U.S. Supreme Court cases each year. The data were obtained from
www.legallanguageexplorer.com.

10

Although the Supreme Court rules on such cases on a fairly regular basis, there are so many
possible factual scenarios that significant litigation at the circuit level continually develops.
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I selected search and seizure cases from the circuit courts by using Lexis to identify
every published11 circuit case from 1953 to 2010 which cites the Fourth Amendment
of the United States Constitution.12 Then all cases on this list which were not decided
on the merits (e.g., ruling on a motion for rehearing en banc) were excluded. The
resulting dataset contains 15,517 cases. This selection method is likely to be somewhat over-inclusive. However, the objective is to build a choice set of all potential
precedents which may be cited with respect to a search and seizure issue. In this context, the primary concern is under-inclusion, and that danger has been ameliorated.
It is difficult to imagine a federal court ruling on a search and seizure issue (or even
discussing it) without citing the Fourth Amendment.
I analyze citation patterns in search and seizure panel opinions from 2000 to 2010.
En banc cases are not analyzed as treatment cases because a circuit sitting en banc
has the authority (not held by a panel) to overturn a previous rulings from their
own circuit (Hellman, 2007). The cases in my dataset from 1953 to 1999 and all
en banc cases are used only as potential precedents which may be cited. For each
treatment case, the choice set includes every precedent from 1953 to the day before
the opinion in the treatment case was issued. The unit of analysis is a treatment
case-precedent pair. There is an observation for each pair between a treatment case
and every precedent in that treatment case’s choice set.
The first stage decision of whether to cite a precedent in the choice set is modeled using a probit model. Since each precedent appears in the dataset every time it
11

Unpublished opinions are excluded both because they are never binding precedent and because
they are unavailable for some circuits until quite recently (Merritt, 1990). Furthermore, any citation
analysis involving unpublished opinions would be significantly complicated by the presence of rules
in many circuits banning or limiting citation to such cases prior to the enactment of Federal Rule
of Appellate Procedure 32.1 on January 1, 2007.
12

Cases are obtained from the eleven numbered geographical circuits and the D.C. Circuit. Intermediate appellate courts with subject-specific jurisdiction were not included in this study.
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is paired with a treatment case, I estimate robust standard errors clustered on the
precedent. For the treatment case-precedent pairs where the precedent was cited,
I use a probit model to model whether the treatment was negative and another to
model whether it was positive. A two-stage decisionmaking process such as this sometimes raises the problem of correlated residuals between the two stages biasing the
estimates at the second stage (Heckman, 1979). However, recent research indicates
that estimation of selection models can cause bigger problems than they purport to
fix (Brandt and Schneider, 2007) and that selection models with categorical outcomes
in the second stage are particularly problematic (Freedman and Sekhon, 2010). Estimation of a Heckman-type selection model for positive treatment is not possible
(using the “heckman” command in Stata produce results that are not concave even
after several dozens of iterations). The results of modeling negative treatment with
this type of model produces results which are substantially similar to those presented
and do not materially alter any of the central substantive conclusions (see Table 2.5
in the Appendix).
I obtain the data on citation and treatment of precedents from Shepard’s Citations,
a legal publication which both lists all citations to a case and classifies the nature of
those citations. Since some treatment categories in Shepard’s can be both ambiguous
and heterogenous, I follow the advice of Spriggs and Hansford (2000), and only utilize treatment categories which clearly indicate either positive or negative treatment.
(Spriggs and Hansford, 2000). I employ their classification of which treatments are
positive and negative and extend that categorization slightly to accommodate treatments Shepard’s has added over time. ‘Followed’ is the only Shepard’s treatment
classified as positive while the negative treatments are the following: ‘Distinguished,’
‘Criticized,’ ‘Limited,’ ‘Questioned,’ ‘Overruled,’ ‘Abrogated,’ ‘Superseded,’ and ‘Dis-
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approved.’ All citations which were not treated positively or negatively I classify as
neutral treatment. The most common neutral treatment is simply ‘Cited.’
The first key explanatory variable is the ideological distance between a treatment
case and a precedent. For the treatment case, I use a measure of the ideology of the
authoring judge since citation decisions are largely (although not entirely) under the
discretion of the author (Cross et al., 2010; King, 2007). While details in an opinion,
including use of citations, are dictated primarily by the author, the overall outcome
and import of a circuit court opinion is more likely to reflect the ideology of all the
judges. Since an author in a treatment case considers a precedent more or less in its
entirety, the ideological location of the precedent is most accurately reflected by the
median judge. Consequently, the ideological location of each precedent is measured
using the median Judicial Common Space (“JCS”) score of the judges.
JCS scores are based on the ideology of the political elites who appointed a judge
and are located on a scale from -1 (liberal) to 1 (conservative) (Epstein et al., 2007;
Giles, Hettinger and Peppers, 2001; Poole, 1998). The variable Ideological Distance is
the absolute value of the difference between the JCS score of the authoring judge in
the treatment case and the median JCS score of the judges in the precedent case. This
variable has a theoretical range from zero to two and higher values indicate greater
iedological disparity. The second key explanatory variable is whether a precedent is
binding or not. This variable, Binding Precedent takes a value of one if the precedent
is from the same circuit as the treatment case and zero otherwise.13 The interaction
between Ideological Distance and Binding Precedent rounds out the key theoretical
explanatory variables.
13

When the Fifth Circuit was split in 1981, the judges agreed that all existing precedents from
the old Fifth Circuit would be binding in the newly created Eleventh Circuit as well (Barrow and
Walker, 1988: 245). Consequently, I code Binding Precedent as one for all precedents from the old
Fifth Circuit when present in the choice set of a case from either the Fifth or Eleventh Circuit.
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Control variables for both the citation and treatment stages of the models include
a number of characteristics of the precedent that have been identified as important:
whether it was written by the author in the treatment case, whether there was a
dissenting opinion, whether it was a per curiam opinion, whether it was decided en
banc, its vitality, the total number of times it has been previously cited by circuit
courts, the total number of times it has been previously treated by circuit courts,
its age, its length (logged number of words), the quality of the legal analysis, and its
similarity to the treatment case (Black and Spriggs, 2008; Hansford and Spriggs, 2006;
Hazelton, Hinkle and Spriggs, 2011; Johnson, 1987; Spriggs and Hansford, 2002). The
length of the treatment case (logged number of words) is also important to include in
both models (Black and Spriggs, 2008). In addition, in the citation model I control for
the logged number of available binding precedents and the workload of the deciding
court.
Determining whether a precedent was written by the author in the treatment
case, had a dissent, and was per curiam or en banc and calculating its age and total
cites and treatments at the time of the treatment case are straightforward (Corley,
2009). Vitality of a precedent is measured as the number of positive treatments by a
published circuit court case minus the number of negative treatments by a published
circuit court case (at the time of the treatment case) (Hansford and Spriggs, 2006).14
The circuit caseload variable is the average number of cases terminated per active
14

Total citations, total treatments, and vitality of a precedent are measured using all citations/treatments of a case by another published circuit court case since 1953, even if the case
was treated by a different circuit.
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judge in the circuit and year of the treatment case. These data were obtained from
the Federal Court Management Statistics.15
Both legal quality of a precedent and similarity between a treatment case and
precedent are important to control for, but elusive concepts to operationalize. For
legal quality, I take an approach similar to Hume (2009) and look to the extent quoted
language is employed in the opinion (Hume, 2009a,b). Arguably, more extensive use
of direct quotations indicates that an opinion is more solidly rooted in the relevant
body of law. Using a series of regular expressions written in Python, I identify all
quoted text in each opinion and generate a measure of the proportion of words in the
opinion which are quoted. The length of the precedent may also be viewed as a rough
measure of legal quality.
In order to formulate a measure of case similarity that is feasible to implement
on a large scale, I turn to the field of machine learning. State-of-the-art information
retrieval systems utilize cosine similarity scores as a normalized metric of the similarity
of the text of two documents. I calculate this measure for every treatment caseprecedent pair in the dataset and scale it from zero to one hundred.16 Cosine similarity
scores do not take into account the order of words, but are generated based on the
number and importance of words which occur in both documents. Words which
appear in fewer documents within the entire corpus are given a higher weight since
they carry more information. For example, the appearance of the word “curtilage” in
two documents would increase the cosine similarity score more than the appearance
15

The Federal Court Management Statistics are available online at http://www.uscourts.
gov/Statistics/FederalCourtManagementStatistics/FederalCourtManagementStatistics_
Archive.aspx.
16

Before calculating cosine similarity scores, I processed the text of each opinion by dropping
citations and stopwords, lemmatizing and stemming the text, and then dropping all tokens which
appeared fewer than ten times in the corpus.

25

of the word “defendant” in both documents. Two search and seizure cases which
discuss curtilage are more likely to be similar cases than two search and seizure cases
which involve a defendant.
In the dataset the actual values of the cosine similarity measure range from one to
fifty and the distribution has a substantial right-hand skew. In order to identify the
most relevant precedents while avoiding estimation problems caused by the sparsity
of data points in the upper end of the range, I create a dummy variable which equals
one if the cosine similarity score is in the top one percent (i.e., greater than 11)
and zero otherwise. This threshold identifies a group of the most similar precedents
which is small enough that a judge might actually consider them all. Clearly a judge
will not actively consider ten thousand potential precedents, but she may very well
evaluate a hundred or so of the most relevant cases, at least in a cursory fashion. This
measurement strategy brings the considerable experience and knowledge of computer
science and computational linguistics to bear on a challenging problem.17
A summary of the dataset is provided in Table 2.1. Since the unit of analysis is
every pairwise combination of a treatment case and every precedent in its choice set,
the size of the dataset is quite large, over 60 million. Table 2.1 provides the mean,
standard deviation, and median of the continuous variables and a percentage breakdown of each of the dichotomous variables. The word length of both the precedent
and the treatment case as well as the size of the choice set of binding precedents are
all transformed by taking their natural log. In about 18% of the cited cases the precedent was positively treated, while the precedent was negatively treated only around
17

Since cosine similarity is calculated using the text of a treatment case, there may be some
endogeneity in this measure. While it would be preferable to use text generated prior to the citation/treatment decision (such as the district court ruling being appealed or legal briefs submitted by
the parties) this type of information is not readily available for most cases in the dataset. Moreover,
endogeneity of the cosine similarity metric is not unduly troubling in this context since it is only
used as a control variable.
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7% of the time. The median precedent is 17 years old, has been cited three times,
has not been treated (and, thus, has a vitality score of zero), and contains 8% quoted
language. About 10% of the time a precedent is binding (i.e., from the same circuit
as the treatment case). Less than a quarter of a percent of precedents were written
by the same author as the treatment case, approximately 15% of precedents have a
dissent, almost 10% were per curiam, and 2.4% were decided en banc.

Continuous Variables
Mean Std. Dev. Med.
Ideological Distance
0.38
0.26
0.34
Vitality
0.13
1.13
0
Total Citations
4.86
6.35
3
Total Treatments
0.85
1.56
0
Age
18.25
11.94
17
Length (prec.)
7.96
0.77
8.01
Proportion Quoted (prec.)
0.09
0.07
0.08
Length (treat.)
8.21
0.64
8.2
Size of Binding Choice Set
7.09
0.42
7.12
Caseload
449.51
155.80
415
Dichotomous Variables
1
0
Citation
0.05%
99.95%
Positive Treatment
18.03%
81.97%
Negative Treatment
6.57%
93.43%
Binding Precedent
10.11%
89.89%
Same Author
0.23%
99.77%
Dissent (prec.)
14.90%
85.10%
Per Curiam (prec.)
9.51%
90.49%
En Banc (prec.)
2.38%
97.62%
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics: The length of both the precedent and the
treatment case are measured as the natural log of the word count. The size
of the binding choice set is also transformed by taking the natural log of
the raw count. The percentages reported for positive and negative treatment
are conditional on a precedent being cited. All other summary statistics are
calculated using all 60,695,465 treatment case-precedent pairs in the dataset.
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2.5

Results

The first decision analyzed is simply which precedents to cite. Figure 2.3 presents
the results of the citation model. Since this dataset contains over 60 million observations, it is worth noting at the outset that a large N does not change the probability
of Type I error, but it does facilitate uncovering very small effects. Consequently, one
must be particularly careful to bear in the mind the distinction between statistical
and substantive significance. Figure 2.3 shows that all three of the main explanatory variables of interest are statistically significant18 and in the expected direction.
The negative coefficient for Ideological Distance demonstrates that the farther away
a judge is ideologically from a persuasive precedent, the less likely she is to cite it
in her opinion. Furthermore, when a judge is ideologically aligned with a precedent,
he is considerably more likely to cite binding precedents than persuasive precedents.
Finally, the interaction between these two is positive which indicates that when a
precedent is binding the effect of ideology is dampened. These findings support the
hypothesis that judges’ decisions about which precedents to cite are constrained by
the doctrinal status of a precedent (as binding or persuasive). In other words, a
judge’s ideological proximity to a precedent has less impact on the citation decision
when the precedent is binding than when it is persuasive.
Figure 2.4 shows the predicted probability of citation for binding (top panel)
and persuasive (bottom panel) precedents at different values of Ideological Distance
(holding all other variables constant at their mean or mode as applicable) with accompanying 95% confidence intervals.19 Since citation to a binding precedent is much
18

All discussion of statistical significance is at the 0.05 level.

19

I generated these predicted probabilities and associated confidence intervals (and all similar
quantities of interest presented throughout this dissertation) using stochastic simulations (Brambor,
Clark and Golder, 2006; King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000).
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Figure 2.3: Citation Model: Probit regression estimates of the effect of Ideological Distance, whether a precedent is binding, their interaction, and a range
of control variables on the decision of whether to cite a precedent. Dots and
diamonds indicate point estimates. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Diamonds (instead of dots) and bars in red denote that a coefficient has a
p-value less than 0.05. The full regression table is presented in the Appendix.

more likely than citing a persuasive precedent, the results are presented on different
scales to provide a more useful visual comparison. For binding precedents, the effect
of Ideological Distance is also negative and statistically significant.20
20

The p-value is 0.006
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Figure 2.4: Effect of Ideological Distance on Citation: This graph provides the
predicted probability of citation and 95% confidence intervals for each type of
precedent (binding and persuasive) at different values of Ideological Distance.
All other variables are held at their mean or mode as applicable.

The very small baseline probability of a case being cited complicates the assessment of substantive significance. The choice set for each treatment case contains ten
to fifteen thousand cases while each opinion actually cites only seven cases from the
choice set on average. As a result, the baseline probability of citation is quite low
simply by virtue of the research design.21 In this context it is more helpful to con21

The only way to remedy this situation would be to construct a much more narrowly tailored
choice set. However, doing so without creating worse problems in terms of issues such as subjective
coding is a major roadblock. In the context of Supreme Court research it is possible to extract
citations from legal briefs or lower court decisions to build a narrower choice set (see, e.g., Spriggs
and Hansford, 2002), but such documents are not widely available for circuit court cases.
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sider effect size in relative, rather than absolute, terms. Holding everything else in
the model at its mean or mode, a binding precedent is seventy-five times more likely
to be cited than a persuasive precedent. The relative effect of Ideological Distance
can be assessed in terms of the percentage increase in the probability of citation from
one standard deviation above the mean of Ideological Distance (farther away) to one
standard deviation below the mean (closer). For persuasive precedents, where ideology has a larger effect, this change results in a 16% increase in the probability of
citation. A binding precedent with Ideological Distance one standard deviation below
the mean is only 4% more likely to be cited than a binding precedent with Ideological
Distance one standard deviation above the mean. Using this metric, the effect of
ideology is four times larger when a judge is not constrained by the doctrine of stare
decisis.
In the citation model several of the control variables perform as expected. Precedents which are more similar to the treatment case, precedents authored by the same
judge as the treatment case, and precedents which have been cited or treated more
frequently are more likely to be cited. Per curiam precedents are less likely to be
cited. When a judge has a a greater number of binding precedents to choose from
the probability of any given case being cited decreases. Finally, the curvilinear effect
of age follows the anticipated pattern. However, results for two of the control variables are curious. Greater length for both the treatment case and precedent actually
decrease the probability of citation.
The second stage of a judge’s decision process is to determine whether and how
to treat those precedents which she has chosen to cite (which reduces the size of the
dataset to 33,263). Since the expectations for positive treatment are similar to those
for citation, I will begin by presenting the results for the positive treatment model
before turning to the negative treatment model. The results of the probit model
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used to explore positive treatment decisions are set forth in Figure 2.5. When the
authoring judge is ideologically aligned with the precedent, he is more likely to cite
binding precedents than persuasive precedents. However, neither Ideological Distance
nor the interaction terms are statistically significant. One possible explanation for no
finding of an ideological effect is the similarity between positive and neutral treatment.
Positive Treatment
Ideological Distance

●

Binding Precedent
ID Distance X Binding

●

Top 1% Similarity
Same Author

●

Dissent (prec.)

●

Per curiam (prec.)

●

En banc (prec.)

●

Vitality
Total Citations
Total Treatments
Age

●

Age2

●

Length (prec.)

●

Prop. Quoted (prec.)
Length (treat.)

●

Intercept

−2.0

−1.5

−1.0

−0.5

0.0
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Figure 2.5: Positive Treatment Model: Probit regression estimates of the effect
of Ideological Distance, whether a precedent is binding, their interaction, and a
range of control variables on the decision to treat a cited precedent positively
(or not). Dots and diamonds indicate point estimates. Bars indicate 95%
confidence intervals. Diamonds (instead of dots) and bars in red denote that
a coefficient has a p-value less than 0.05. The full regression table is presented
in the Appendix.
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As discussed previously, increased positive treatment of binding precedents without accompanying ideological dampening is consistent with legal constraint, but not
sufficient to exclude other explanations. Moreover, the difference in positive treatment rates for binding and persuasive precedents is not statistically significant for all
possible values of Ideological Distance. Figure 2.6 plots the difference between the
probability of citing a binding precedent and the probability of citing a persuasive
precedent over the entire range of Ideological Distance observed in the dataset. The
95% confidence interval includes zero for all values of Ideological Distance greater
than 0.83. However, for nearly 95% of the data Ideological Distance falls below this
threshold.
While most of the control variables are not statistically significant in the positive
treatment model, those which are largely perform as expected. Cited precedents
which have a cosine similarity score in the top one percent, have greater vitality,
and have been treated more frequently are all more likely to be positively treated.
A precedent being cited more frequently actually results in a slightly lower rate of
positive treatment. Finally, one of the variables designed to roughly approximate
the legal quality of a precedent, proportion of text which is quoted, increases the
probability of positive treatment as expected.
Figure 2.7 contains the results of the negative treatment model. As expected,
Ideological Distance increases the probability of negative treatment. The predicted
probability graph in Figure 2.8 illustrates that this effect is statistically significant
for binding precedents as well as persuasive precedents. Judges are more likely to
treat a precedent negatively when it is more ideologically distant. As hypothesized,
negative treatment of binding precedents is less likely than negative treatment of
persuasive precedents. Figure 2.9 shows that this difference is statistically significant
for all values of Ideological Distance in the data.
33

0.10
0.05
0
−0.05

0.83

−0.10

Pr(Pos. Trt.|Binding) − Pr(Pos. Trt.|Persuasive)

Difference in Probability of Positive Treatment of
Binding and Persuasive Precedent

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

Ideological Distance

Figure 2.6: Effect of Ideological Distance on Difference Between Positive Treatment of Binding and Persuasive Precedents: This graph provides the difference
in the predicted probability of positively treating a binding and persuasive
precedent (and the associated 95% confidence interval) at different values of
Ideological Distance. All other variables are held at their mean or mode conditional on a precedent being cited.

The interaction term is not statistically significant. The similar slope for binding
and persuasive precedents in Figure 2.8 illustrates that the effect of ideology does not
appear to be dampened for binding precedents. However, for negative treatment the
significantly different predicted probabilities for binding and persuasive precedents
provides evidence of legal constraint. Stare decisis is the only logical explanation for
judges consistently showing more restraint in negatively treating binding precedents
and being more free with negative treatment of persuasive precedents. Moreover, the
gap is relatively substantial, given the infrequent nature of negative treatment. Over
the range of Ideological Distance (and holding other variables constant at the mean
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Negative Treatment
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Dissent (prec.)
Per curiam (prec.)
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Figure 2.7: Negative Treatment Model: Probit regression estimates of the
effect of Ideological Distance, whether a precedent is binding, their interaction,
and a range of control variables on the decision to treat a cited precedent
negatively (or not). Dots and diamonds indicate point estimates. Bars indicate
95% confidence intervals. Diamonds (instead of dots) and bars in red denote
that a coefficient has a p-value less than 0.05. The full regression table is
presented in the Appendix.

or mode) the absolute rate of negative treatment for binding precedents is between
1.6% and 2% lower than for persuasive precedents. Relatively speaking, the average
persuasive precedent is 80% more likely to be treated negatively than the average
binding precedent.
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Figure 2.8: Effect of Ideological Distance on Negative Treatment: This graph
provides the predicted probability and 95% confidence intervals of negatively
treating a cited precedent for each type of precedent (binding and persuasive)
at different values of Ideological Distance. All other variables are held at their
mean or modal value conditional on a precedent being cited.

In the negative treatment model, most of the control variables are statistically
significant. Notably, treatment case-precedent pairs with similarity scores in the top
1% are more likely to be treated negatively, just as they are more likely to be treated
positively. As one might expect, precedents with a dissent and older precedents
are more likely to be treated negatively. Precedents written by the same author,
precedents with greater Vitality, more heavily cited precedents, and longer precedents
are all less likely to be negatively treated. Interestingly, after controlling for vitality,
precedents which have been treated more frequently are more likely to be treated
negatively. Perhaps increased discussion of a case leads to chipping away at the rule
set forth in the case. The remaining control variables are not statistically significant.
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Figure 2.9: Effect of Ideological Distance on Difference Between Negative
Treatment of Binding and Persuasive Precedents: This graph provides the
difference in the predicted probability of negatively treating a binding and
persuasive precedent (and the associated 95% confidence interval) at different
values of Ideological Distance. All other variables are held at their mean or
mode conditional on a precedent being cited.

2.6

Discussion

Examining circuit court citation practices with regard to their own published
precedents provides insight into when and how law constrains judicial behavior and
also highlights the need for continued investigation. The extensive data collected for
this project facilitates close examination of the choices circuit judges make when deciding which circuit court precedents to incorporate into their opinions. As expected,
ideology plays a role in the selection of precedents.
Remarkably, the effect of ideology on deciding whether to cite a case is significantly
lessened when the precedent is from the same circuit. This pattern provides evidence
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that the legal doctrine of stare decisis constrains judges’ behavior. That is, judges
act less ideologically when considering precedents which are binding as a matter of
legal doctrine. On one hand, law dictates that published precedents from one’s own
circuit have virtually the same legal status as U.S. Supreme Court opinions (as long as
there is no conflicting Supreme Court case). On the other hand, published precedents
from other circuits are simply persuasive. Similar to a law review article, judges may
refer to such a source if they find the reasoning persuasive or helpful, but have no
obligation to do so under the law. The data provide evidence that these rules have
an effect on judges. Judges are not only less ideological about the decision to cite
binding precedents, they are also much more likely to cite binding precedents overall.
Since there is evidence that law constrains judges’ determination of which cases
to cite, one would also expect to find similar influence over decisions of how to treat
cited cases. Since treatment decisions are clearly visible within the four corners of an
opinion without consulting outside resources, it would make sense for judges to be
even more careful about complying with legal doctrine. However, there is no evidence
of ideological dampening for either positive or negative treatment. In fact, there is no
evidence that ideology is a significant factor in the positive treatment decision at all.
Most likely the lack of traction in the positive treatment model is due to similarity
between neutral and positive treatments. In practice, merely citing a precedent is a
type of soft positive treatment. Within the context of legal writing a citation to a
precedent is understood to tacitly indicate acknowledgment and applicability. The
fact that most of the control variables in the positive treatment model also fail to
reach statistical significance further supports this conclusion.
While there is no evidence of ideological dampening on the decision to negatively
treat a cited precedent, there is evidence that this decision is constrained by stare
decisis. Judges are about 80% more likely to negatively treat a persuasive precedent
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than a binding precedent. There can certainly be purely legal reasons to criticize or
distinguish a precedent. But judges may have ideological reasons for doing so as well.
The consistently lower rate of such negative treatment of binding precedents suggests
judges refrain, at least to some extent, from negatively treating for ideological reasons
when a precedent is binding.
The evidence of legal constraint this study provides overcomes a significant challenge in the study of how law influences judges. The institutional structure of the U.S.
Courts of Appeals as twelve separate entities combines with the legal doctrine that
in-circuit and out-of-circuit precedents have a different legal status to create a unique
research opportunity. Each precedent in the dataset is considered by some judges as a
binding precedent and by others as merely persuasive. The utility and novelty of this
research design lies in the fact that it obviates concerns about unmeasured differences
between two groups of cases, one consisting of binding precedents and the other of
persuasive precedents. This approach illustrates the utility of extracting and studying information from the text of court opinions. Looking at how circuit court judges
use precedent provides an opportunity to gain more nuanced insights into how and
when judges are constrained by legal doctrine in a way which mitigates endogeneity
concerns.
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2.7

Appendix
Intercept
Ideological Distance
Binding Precedent
ID X Binding
Top 1% Similarity Score
Same Author
Dissent
Per Curiam
En Banc
Vitality
Total Cites
Total Treatments
Age
Age2
Precedent Length
Proportion Quoted
Treatment case length
Binding Choice Set
Caseload
N

Coefficient
−1.011∗
−0.066∗
1.092∗
0.043∗
1.723∗
0.142∗
0.005
−0.185∗
−0.070
0.000
0.015∗
0.019∗
−0.039∗
0.000∗
−0.149∗
0.024
−0.052∗
−0.143∗
0.000

Standard Error p-value
0.084
0.000
0.014
0.000
0.010
0.000
0.018
0.015
0.009
0.000
0.013
0.000
0.012
0.671
0.020
0.000
0.040
0.079
0.006
1.000
0.003
0.000
0.009
0.034
0.002
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.007
0.000
0.072
0.739
0.004
0.000
0.008
0.000
0.000
0.221
60,695,465

Table 2.2: Citation Model: Probit regression estimates of the effect of Ideological Distance, whether a precedent is binding, their interaction, and a range
of control variables on the decision of whether to cite a precedent. The reported standard errors are robust standard errors which are clustered on the
precedent and * denotes a p-value less than 0.05.
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Coefficient
Intercept
−1.692∗
Ideological Distance
0.050
Binding Precedent
0.102∗
ID Distance X Binding
−0.029
Top 1% Similarity Score
0.422∗
Same Author
−0.016
Dissent (prec.)
0.030
Per Curiam (prec.)
0.046
En Banc (prec.)
0.005
Vitality
0.045∗
Total Cites
−0.008∗
Total Treatments
0.022∗
Age
0.003
2
Age
0.000
Precedent Length
0.010
Proportion Quoted (prec.)
0.559∗
Treatment case length
0.026
N

Standard Error p-value
0.152
0.000
0.062
0.420
0.034
0.003
0.072
0.688
0.019
0.000
0.036
0.661
0.023
0.181
0.050
0.356
0.052
0.924
0.006
0.000
0.002
0.000
0.006
0.000
0.003
0.408
0.000
0.664
0.015
0.481
0.157
0.000
0.014
0.065
33,263

Table 2.3: Positive Treatment Model: Probit regression estimates of the effect
of Ideological Distance, whether a precedent is binding, their interaction, and a
range of control variables on the decision to treat a cited precedent positively
(or not). The reported standard errors are robust standard errors which are
clustered on the precedent and * denotes a p-value less than 0.05.
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Coefficient
Intercept
−1.542∗
Ideological Distance
0.168∗
Binding Precedent
−0.252∗
ID Distance X Binding
0.006
Top 1% Similarity Score
0.552∗
Same Author
−0.173∗
Dissent (prec.)
0.099∗
Per Curiam (prec.)
−0.022
En Banc (prec.)
−0.071
Vitality
−0.070∗
Total Cites
−0.010∗
Total Treatments
0.069∗
Age
0.008
2
Age
0.000
Precedent Length
−0.069∗
Proportion Quoted (prec.)
−0.067
Treatment case length
0.028
N

Standard Error p-value
0.208
0.000
0.071
0.018
0.040
0.000
0.084
0.944
0.028
0.000
0.059
0.003
0.031
0.001
0.066
0.737
0.065
0.272
0.007
0.000
0.003
0.001
0.008
0.000
0.005
0.092
0.000
0.995
0.020
0.001
0.219
0.758
0.020
0.155
33,263

Table 2.4: Negative Treatment Model: Probit regression estimates of the effect
of Ideological Distance, whether a precedent is binding, their interaction, and a
range of control variables on the decision to treat a cited precedent negatively
(or not). The reported standard errors are robust standard errors which are
clustered on the precedent and * denotes a p-value less than 0.05.
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Coefficient
Negative Treatment
Intercept
Ideological Distance
Binding Precedent
ID X Binding
Top 1% Similarity Score
Same Author
Dissent
Per Curiam
En Banc
Vitality
Total Cites
Total Treatments
Age
Age2
Precedent Length
Proportion Quoted (prec.)
Treatment case length
N
Citation
Intercept
Ideological Distance
Binding Precedent
ID X Binding
Top 1% Similarity Score
Same Author
Dissent
Per Curiam
En Banc
Vitality
Total Cites
Total Treatments
Age
Age2
Precedent Length
Proportion Quoted (prec.)
Treatment case length
Binding Choice Set
Caseload
N
ρ
σ

Standard Error p-value

0.133∗
0.029∗
−0.051∗
−0.009
0.027∗
−0.018∗
0.013∗
−0.003
−0.017∗
−0.013∗
−0.002∗
0.011∗
0.002∗
0.000
−0.008∗
−0.008
0.005∗

0.032
0.013
0.008
0.014
0.009
0.005
0.005
0.008
0.008
0.002
0.000
0.001
0.001
0.000
0.003
0.027
0.002
33,263

0.000
0.023
0.000
0.491
0.004
0.000
0.005
0.753
0.033
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.012
0.965
0.003
0.770
0.035

−0.935∗
−0.067∗
1.094∗
0.038∗
1.716∗
0.144∗
0.003
−0.197∗
0.043
−0.020∗
0.033∗
0.021∗
−0.032∗
0.000∗
−0.134∗
−0.118
−0.057∗
−0.171∗
0.000

0.081
0.014
0.010
0.018
0.009
0.013
0.011
0.019
0.028
0.007
0.002
0.005
0.001
0.000
0.006
0.066
0.004
0.008
0.000
60,695,465
0.026
0.003

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.033
0.000
0.000
0.806
0.000
0.123
0.003
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.073
0.000
0.000
0.720

−0.080
0.245

Table 2.5: Heckman Negative Treatment Model: Heckman selection model
regression estimates of the effect of Ideological Distance, whether a precedent
is from the same circuit, their interaction, and a range of control variables on a
judge’s two-stage decision of whether to cite a precedent and, if cited, whether
to treat it negatively. The selection equation (citation) is a probit model and
the outcome equation (negative treatment) is a linear probability model with
standard errors adjusted to account for the correlation between the residuals
of the two equations. The reported standard errors are robust standard errors
which are clustered on the precedent and * denotes a p-value less than 0.05.
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Chapter 3
Strategic Anticipation
of En Banc Review

The previous chapter provides evidence that federal circuit judges are constrained
by the norm of stare decisis. The existing state of the law is one of the factors which
influences how judges write the opinions which dynamically shape the contours of
the law. This observation raises the question of why judges’ act in a constrained
fashion. Political scientists often cite the fear of reversal and desire for promotion
as primary motivations, framing the judicial hierarchy as a typical principal-agent
relationship (Boyd and Spriggs, 2009; Choi, Gulati and Posner, 2012; Epstein and
Jacobi, 2010; Randazzo, 2008). This framework posits that judges follow the law only
when institutional features combine to create disincentives for abandoning established
doctrine. However, the quest for empirical evidence of strategic judicial behavior
has produced mixed results (Collins and Martinek, 2011; Bowie and Songer, 2009;
Blackstone and Smelcer, 2008; Giles et al., 2007; Cross, 2003; George, 1997). In
this chapter I examine whether judges’ compliance with stare decisis is strategic.
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Specifically, I investigate the impact of institutional context on citation practices in
the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
Federal circuit judges have very little chance of promotion. Consequently, in the
context of a principal-agent model, fear of reversal is the primary explanation for why
a policy-motivated circuit judge would follow the doctrine of stare decisis (Cameron,
Segal and Songer, 2000; Kim, 2006). Three-judge panels in the U.S. Courts of Appeals
face oversight from two sources, their own circuit rehearing a case in an en banc
proceeding and the U.S. Supreme Court (Boyd and Spriggs, 2009; Kim, 2006). This
chapter focuses on the former source of oversight. I explore whether circuit court
panels adjust their level of adherence to legal doctrine in strategic anticipation of en
banc review. In this context, strategic action is particularly feasible because actors
consider the possibility of review by colleagues who are very well known to them from
regular interactions (Bowie and Songer, 2009; Giles et al., 2007).
This chapter empirically tests for evidence of strategic anticipation of en banc
review using a subset of the citation data employed in Chapter 2. The choice set for
citation analysis is composed only of binding precedents (i.e., those originating within
the same circuit as the treatment case). If there is strategic behavior, the relative location of the author of a panel opinion, the precedent, and the circuit will all influence
citation and treatment decisions. The results show that the ideological preferences of
the entire circuit influence citation and treatment decisions both directly and indirectly. Decisions regarding citation and negative treatment are directly influenced by
circuit preferences, and the extent to which an author’s ideology influences positive
treatment decisions is contingent upon the ideology of the entire circuit.
These results provide insight into the role of strategy in the often overlooked
hierarchical relationship between circuit court panels and their circuit. Exploring this
dynamic is key to understanding issues such as the interplay between stare decisis and
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ideological shifts brought about by personnel changes within circuits. Scholars have
increasingly recognized that both law and ideology play important roles in judicial
decisionmaking and the nuances of when, how, why, and under what conditions these
factors matter present fascinating and challenging questions. This study furthers this
tradition by offering insight into the relationship between respect for the doctrine of
stare decisis and ideological expediency.

3.1

Strategic Behavior in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals

The vast majority of federal case law is established by the U.S. Courts of Appeals
rather than the U.S. Supreme Court. The resulting importance of the policymaking
function of the intermediate appellate courts is reflected by the fact that cases are
not resolved by an individual judge, but by a group of judges working together. This
institutional structure results from the idea that multiple judges are more likely to
produce legally sound decisions and less likely to make mistakes (Boyd and Spriggs,
2009; Hettinger, Lindquist and Martinek, 2006). The impracticability of determining
objectively what constitutes the “correct” or “best” result in any given case renders
this proposition largely unfalsifiable (Cross, 2005). Nevertheless, the fact that circuit
judges make decisions as part of a group rather than individually is a significant
institutional feature and its implications can be (and are) explored empirically.
Scholars have long recognized that actors working in such a group context may
act strategically by taking into account their colleagues’ anticipated actions when
determining what actions will be most successful to obtain their own ideological preferences in the long run (Atkins, 1972; Boucher and Segal, 1995; Bowie and Songer,
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2009; Cameron, Segal and Songer, 2000; Collins and Martinek, 2011; George, 1997;
King, 2007; Law, 2004; Lindquist, Martinek and Hettinger, 2007; Maltzman, Spriggs
and Wahlbeck, 2000). Strategy comes into play in a hierarchical context as well. A
principal-agent framework is often employed to examine how lower court judges, as
agents, modify their behavior based on their estimation of how higher court judges, as
principals, will exercise oversight (Boyd and Spriggs, 2009; Choi, Gulati and Posner,
2012; Epstein and Jacobi, 2010; Randazzo, 2008). The federal circuit courts provide a context within which all the judges in a circuit alternatively function as both
colleagues and superiors to one another.
For bulk of their caseload, federal circuit judges decide cases in randomly assigned
panels of three (Collins and Martinek, 2011; Kim, 2009). Consequently, each judge
in a circuit repeatedly works in conjunction with different combinations of her circuit
colleagues. In any given case, the assigned three-judge panel may or may not reflect
the ideological composition of the circuit as a whole. As a matter of law, any published
opinion issued by a panel is binding on future panels in the circuit (Barnett, 2002).
However, if a panel’s ruling is too extreme, the circuit can choose to re-hear the case
en banc with all of the active judges in the circuit participating.1 This arrangement
puts interesting dynamics into play (Atkins, 1972).
The possibility of en banc review creates an institutional configuration which appears ripe to produce strategic action (Haire, Lindquist and Songer, 2003; Hettinger,
Lindquist and Martinek, 2004; Kim, 2009; Lindquist, Martinek and Hettinger, 2007;
Spitzer and Talley, 2000; Van Winkle, 1997). Judges who are in the ideological minority in their circuit will have the opportunity at some point to sit on a panel with
1

The exception is the Ninth Circuit which hears en banc cases using a subset of eleven judges
because bringing all the judges on the circuit together to rule on such cases is too unwieldy (Posner,
2000).

47

one or more similarly-minded colleagues. This offers the opportunity to shape the law
of their circuit in a manner which is consistent with their own preferences. There is
evidence that judges take advantage of such opportunities (Atkins, 1972; Van Winkle,
1997). Yet judges may still be mindful of the possibility of en banc review. While very
few cases are re-heard en banc (George and Solimine, 2001), the possibility still poses
an extant threat to discourage rulings which are manifestly at odds with the majority
of the circuit. Evidence indicates that this reality tempers the extent to which ideology influences judges’ votes (Blackstone and Smelcer, 2008; Van Winkle, 1997). Van
Winkle (1997) finds that judges who are in the ideological minority in a circuit are increasingly likely to vote according to their ideology when the have more allies in their
circuit. In a similar vein, Blackstone and Smelcer (2008) present evidence that circuit
judges in the minority of their circuit act less ideologically than their counterparts
in the majority even when sitting on a panel with another similarly-minded judge.
However, Hettinger et. al. (2004) fail to find evidence of circuit judges strategically
anticipating en banc review.
There are multiple reasons why a circuit judge might want to avoid en banc review
that must be weighed against the probability of such rehearing.2 First, the possibility
(if the en banc petition is granted) of the panel ruling being reversed and the law
of the circuit being materially altered is against the judge’s own interests. He might
very well choose to temper the language and moderate the content of a legal policy
in order to avoid the circuit instituting a more undesirable policy en banc. Second,
2

There are no corollary reasons for panel judges to seek out en banc review. Panels have the
authority to make binding law in their circuit. Any small increase in the prestige of an en banc
ruling over a normal decision is heavily outweighed by the resources necessary to rule on a case en
banc. This is an important distinction between en banc review and Supreme Court review. A circuit
panel can benefit substantially from having the Supreme Court affirm its decision because such a
ruling would substantially expand both the importance and geographic impact of the case. There is
no similar benefit to being affirmed en banc.
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unlike review by a higher court, en banc review adds a considerable additional burden
to the workload of the panel judges regardless of the outcome of the review since they
are included in the rehearing of the case. In fact, the mere filing of a petition for
rehearing en banc adds to a judge’s workload. At a minimum the judge has to consider
the petition.3 In some circuits once a judge requests a vote on an en banc petition
standard practice permits/expects the author of the panel opinion to write a memo
in response to the petition. The third reason a panel judge is incentivized to avoid
en banc rehearing is that rehearing creates additional work for one’s colleagues. In a
collegial environment where judges work with a relatively small handful of colleagues
on a regular basis, long-term interests in not aggravating those colleagues may militate
in favor of taking pains to avoid unnecessary en banc situations.
As many scholars have discussed, circuit judges may also act strategically with
respect to the Supreme Court (Bowie and Songer, 2009; Cross, 2003; George, 1997;
Haire, Lindquist and Songer, 2003). For example, a judge in the minority of the circuit
might be more inclined to write dissenting opinions, thus signaling the Supreme Court
to grant certiorari, when ideologically aligned with the Supreme Court (Caldeira,
Wright and Zorn, 1999; Caldeira and Wright, 1988; Hettinger, Lindquist and Martinek, 2004). The evidence of this type of strategic behavior is mixed (Bowie and
Songer, 2009; Cross, 2003; Kim, 2009). Haire et. al. (2003) find that circuits reverse
district court rulings more often when the ruling under scrutiny is contrary to the
Supreme Court’s preferences. Westerland et. al. (2010) present evidence that circuit
judges show less deference to Supreme Court precedents when they diverge from the
3

A formal vote is only conducted if at least one judge requests a vote. Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure 35(f). Consequently, in practice the majority of en banc petitions languish without even
a vote. The is somewhat analogous to the agenda-setting process in the Supreme Court. Requesting
a vote on a petition is similar in effect to putting a cert petition on the discuss list.
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preferences of the current Supreme Court. Both of these findings are suggestive of
strategic behavior.
If anything, strategic behavior might be even more likely within the circuit than
with respect to the Supreme Court. The more immediate incentives to avoid en banc
review are coupled with greater information about the relevant players which may
enable circuit judges to be more efficiently strategic in the circuit context. Because
each judge works with all of her colleagues in turn, circuit judges have the opportunity
to develop extensive knowledge about the ideological preferences of the people who
will make the decision about which cases to rehear en banc (Bowie and Songer, 2009;
Giles et al., 2007). This chapter focuses on strategic anticipation of en banc review
and leaves the complication of dual principals for future research.
Many studies looking for evidence of strategy focus on case outcomes or judges’
votes. The difficulty in finding consistent evidence of strategic anticipation of en
banc review may be attributable to circuit judges acting strategically in ways which
are difficult to detect rather than to an absence of strategy. One of the challenges
faced by judicial scholars is finding more nuanced modes of analysis which can detect
subtler aspects of judicial behavior than votes. I go beyond votes and case outcomes
to look for strategic behavior in the citation patterns of circuit court opinions. Both
a judge’s decision about which cases to cite and the discussion of the cited cases may
be strategic with respect to the possibility of en banc review. While scholars have
utilized citation analysis to study the Supreme Court (Hansford and Spriggs, 2006;
Spriggs and Hansford, 2002; Walsh, 1997), to examine how circuit courts interact
with Supreme Court precedent (Benesh and Reddick, 2002; Corley, 2009; Johnson,
1987; Niblett and Yoon, 2012; Westerland et al., 2010; Yoon, 2012) and to look for
strategic anticipation in the actions of federal district judges (Boyd and Spriggs,
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2009), deploying such analysis to investigate the impact of institutional structure on
the inner-workings of circuit decisionmaking remains largely uncharted territory.
While all published in-circuit precedents are equally binding as a matter of legal doctrine (assuming they are applicable to the facts of the case) (Barnett, 2002),
whether such equality is maintained in the face of strategic incentives to the contrary remains an open question. Aldisert (1989) opined that “[t]oo many advocates
and commentators assume that all precedents are equivalent, that all are precedents
fortissimo” (Aldisert, 1989: 630). Other observers have frequently pointed out the
potential for judges to selectively cite and interpret precedents which suit their own
purposes (Barnett, 2002; Cross et al., 2010; Hansford and Spriggs, 2006; Johnson,
1987; Niblett, 2010; Spriggs and Hansford, 2002). Not only are judges more likely
to cite precedents which are closer to them ideologically, but there is also evidence
that judges are more likely to comply with binding precedent when there is a greater
chance their decision would be reviewed and overturned by a higher court (Collins,
2010; Westerland et al., 2010).
If strategic behavior is at work in the circuit courts, a panel would be most likely
to strictly adhere to legal doctrine regarding the binding nature of precedent when it
anticipates that en banc review is particularly likely. Conversely, if a panel anticipates
a lack of oversight by the full circuit, there is little (or at least less) reason to act
within the constraints of a binding precedent the panel finds unpalatable. Examining
the characteristics of precedents that are not cited, those that are cited, and the
uses of cited precedent provides an opportunity to look for these manifestations of
strategy.
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3.2

Modeling Citations: Strategy and Ideology

A simple model of strategic citation decisions facilitates the formation of hypotheses. Consider a judge who is crafting a panel opinion and deciding whether and how
to cite a precedent. Three key factors come into play; the ideological location of
the precedent, P ; the panel author, A;4 and the circuit median, C. Each of these
points can be placed in one-dimensional space as illustrated in the top panel of Figure 3.1. Boyd and Spriggs (2009) construct a model for an analogous situation with
three moving parts designed to investigate the impact of judicial hierarchy on citation
behavior. I adapt their framework to the similar situation at hand.
In Chapter 2, evidence revealed that even when judges are constrained by law,
their own ideology continues to play a role. This result is consistent with the long
line of research which demonstrates the important role of ideology in judicial decisionmaking more broadly. Accordingly, the first quantity of interest is the distance
between an authoring judge and a precedent, |A − P |, which I refer to as Ideological
Distance and is illustrated in the second panel of Figure 3.1. When an author is closer
to a precedent she is more likely to cite or positively treat a precedent and less likely
to negatively treat a cited precedent.
The primary focus of this chapter is investigating whether circuit judges writing
panel opinions strategically anticipate en banc review. This type of strategy can
manifest in two ways. First, the location of the circuit can directly impact citationrelated decisions. Second, the location of the circuit may moderate the effect of an
author’s ideology on such decisions. In other words, authors of panel opinions may
strategically reign in their own ideology to a greater extent when circuit preferences
4

While the other two judges on the panel might occasionally request changes to a draft, the
author has the most direct control over citation and treatment decisions.
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Ideological Distance: |A - P|
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When C is in the shaded region, Relative Disance < 0.

A

P
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When C is in the shaded region, Relative Disance > 0.
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of Components of the Strategic Anticipation Model:
The ideological location of the author of a panel opinion is denoted by A while
P is the location of the precedent median and C is the relevant circuit median.
Relative Distance = |A − P | − |C − P |.

make en banc review more likely. A strategic judge will not just take the circuit’s
location itself into account, but the location of the circuit in relationship to both
the precedent and herself. I incorporate the concept developed by Boyd and Spriggs
(2009) of measuring the Relative Distance of the author to a precedent relative to
the distance between the circuit and the precedent. Formally, this quantity is the
53

distance between the author and precedent minus the distance between the circuit
and the precedent, |A − P | − |C − P |.
The bottom two panels in Figure 3.1 depict two general scenarios which may
occur. First, the circuit median, C, may be farther away from the precedent, P , than
the author is. This is the case if C is located anywhere along the shaded region of
the line in the third panel, i.e., if C is less than A or greater than A0 (the reflection
around P of the author’s location). When this is the case Relative Distance will
necessarily have a negative value. Smaller values of Relative Distance indicate that
the author is increasingly closer to the precedent relative to the circuit median. On
the other hand, if C is in the shaded region of the line depicted in the bottom panel
(A < C < A0 ), the circuit median is closer to the precedent than the author of the
panel opinion is. Under these circumstances, Relative Distance will be greater than
zero. As Relative Distance gets larger, the author is farther away from the precedent
relative to the location of the circuit. If the author and circuit are equidistant from
the precedent, Relative Distance equal zero.
Holding the location of an author (A) and precedent (P ) constant, as the circuit
gets closer to the precedent, Relative Distance increases. The closer the circuit is to
the precedent, the more likely it is to punish departures from the doctrine of stare
decisis because such departures are contrary to the circuit’s preferences. Although
stare decisis leaves considerable room for judges to exercise discretion (Kim, 2006),
greater compliance with stare decisis should manifest as an overall higher likelihood
of citation and positive treatment and a lower rate of negative treatment. Therefore,
I hypothesize that as Relative Distance increases, the panel is more likely to cite and
positively treat and less likely to negatively treat a precedent.
The second manifestation of strategic anticipation of en banc review is how the
location of the circuit has an impact on how the author’s ideology influences citation
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and treatment decisions. This dynamic would reveal itself as an interaction effect
between Ideological Distance and Relative Distance. An author who is closer to a
precedent relative to the circuit may rely more on ideology without as much concern
about en banc review as an author who is more distant from a precedent relative
to the circuit. Under extreme circumstances, when an author is very far from a
precedent and the circuit is closely aligned with the precedent, the direction of the
effect of Ideological Distance might even flip. Such an author may go out of his way
to show deference to precedents farther from his own ideal point in anticipation that
the circuit will be applying a higher level of scrutiny to his actions. I hypothesize
that Ideological Distance will have a larger effect size when Relative Distance is small
and that the effect size will decrease, and perhaps even flip signs, as Relative Distance
increases. These and the forgoing hypotheses are summarized in Table 3.1.
Variable
Ideological Distance
Relative Distance
ID X Relative Distance

Citation
+
+

Positive Treatment
+
+

Negative Treatment
+
-

Table 3.1: Hypothesized sign for key explanatory variables.

3.3

Data and Research Design

The original database of published circuit court search and seizure cases which I
introduced in Chapter 2 is also used to empirically test the hypotheses in this chapter.
The sole focus here is on variation in the use and treatment of binding precedents, so
the choice set for each treatment case includes only the available binding precedents
(i.e., those from within the same circuit as the treatment case). Since the choice sets
are smaller, it is practical to widen the scope of treatment cases under examination.
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I model the citation and treatment decisions in 8,514 cases from 1990 to 2010. There
is an observation for each pair between a treatment case and every precedent in that
treatment case’s choice set which results in a dataset containing over nine million
observations. The outcome variables of citation, positive treatment, and negative
treatment are also the same as in Chapter 2, and I use a probit model to test each.5
The models presented here also include a set of control variables similar to those
employed in Chapter 2. The control variables in all three models include similarity between the precedent and the treatment case, whether the treatment case and
precedent were written by the same author, whether there was a dissenting opinion in the precedent, whether the precedent was a per curiam opinion, whether the
precedent was decided en banc, its vitality, the total number of times it has been previously treated by circuit courts, its age, the length of both opinions (logged number
of words), and the proportion of quoted text in the precedent. The citation model
also has additional control variables for the logged number of available precedents
and the workload of the deciding court. The measures of how a precedent has been
treated by circuit courts in the past (Vitality, Total Citations, and Total Treatments)
are calculated based on all past references to a precedent in a published circuit court
case from 1953 to the year before the treatment case. Citations and treatments from
all circuits are included, not just those from the same circuit as the treatment case.
A summary of the dataset is provided in Table 3.2 which includes the mean, standard deviation, and median of the continuous variables and a percentage breakdown
of each of the dichotomous variables. The word length of both the precedent and the
treatment case as well as the size of the choice set are all transformed by taking their
natural log. In about 15% of the cited cases the precedent was positively treated,
5

Once again, alternative specification using selection models either will not run or do not materially alter my results.
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while a cited precedent was negatively treated only around 5% of the time. The median precedent is 15 years old, has been cited 3 times but not treated (and, thus, has
a vitality score of zero), and contains 7% quoted language. About 2% of precedents
were written by the same author as the treatment case, approximately 14% have a
dissent, 10.5% were decided per curiam, and 2% were decided en banc.

Continuous Variables
Mean Std. Dev. Med.
Ideological Distance
0.35
0.27
0.32
Relative Distance
0.07
0.28
0.05
Vitality
0.08
1.09
0
Total Citations
4.71
6.24
3
Total Treatments
0.77
1.51
0
Age
16.66
11.29
15
Length (prec.)
7.87
0.77
7.92
Proportion Quoted (prec.)
0.09
0.08
0.07
Length (treat.)
8.12
0.67
8.14
Size of Choice Set
7.10
0.42
7.17
Caseload
465.58
148.88
445
Dichotomous Variables
1
0
Citation
0.41%
99.59%
Positive Treatment
15.10%
84.90%
Negative Treatment
5.33%
94.67%
Same Author
2.23%
97.77%
Dissent (prec.)
14.20%
85.80%
Per Curiam (prec.)
10.49%
89.51%
En Banc (prec.)
2.18%
97.82%
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics: The length of both the precedent and the
treatment case are measured as the natural log of the word count. The size of
the choice set is also transformed by taking the natural log of the raw count.
The percentages reported for positive and negative treatment are conditional
on a precedent being cited. All other summary statistics are calculated using
all 9,607,742 treatment case-precedent pairs in the dataset.
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3.4

Results

The first place I look for evidence of strategic anticipation of en banc review is
a panel opinion author’s decision regarding which precedents to cite and which to
ignore. Figure 3.2 presents the results of the citation model. The coefficients for
Ideological Distance and Relative Distance are both statistically significant and in
the expected direction, but the interaction between the two is not significant. The
negative coefficient for Ideological Distance indicates that when the panel author
and the circuit median are the same distance away from a precedent, the author’s
ideology has the expected influence on citation. The farther away an author is from
the precedent, the less likely she is to cite it. The positive coefficient for Relative
Distance indicates that when an author is aligned with a precedent he is more likely
to cite the precedent when the circuit median is closer to the precedent.
Since the model includes an interaction between two continuous variables, the
information which can be gleaned solely from the regression results presented in Figure
3.2 is limited. Plotting marginal effects and predicted probabilities provides important
additional insight. These graphs are presented in Figures 3.3 and 3.4. Figure 3.3
shows the marginal effect of each variable while the other (and all control variables)
are set at their median. Marginal effects are the change in predicted probability
which occurs when the constituent variable in question is increased by one standard
deviation. The panel on the left demonstrates that the marginal effect of Ideological
Distance is negative and statistically significant for all observed values of Ideological
Distance. This finding holds true for values of Relative Distance greater than or equal
to -0.22 (which includes 87% of the data).
The predicted probability of citation over the range of Ideological Distance is
depicted in the left panel of Figure 3.4. While the substantive effect of Ideological
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Citation
Ideological Distance
Relative Distance
ID X Relative Distance

●

Top 1% Similarity
Same Author
Dissent (prec.)

●

Per curiam (prec.)
En banc (prec.)

●

Vitality

●

Total Citations
Total Treatments

●

Age
Age2
Length (prec.)
Prop. Quoted (prec.)

●

Length (treat.)

●

Size of Choice Set
Caseload

●

Intercept

−1.0

−0.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

Figure 3.2: Citation Model: Probit regression estimates of the effect of Ideological Distance, Relative Distance, their interaction, and a range of control
variables on the decision of whether to cite a precedent. Dots and diamonds
indicate point estimates. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. Diamonds
(instead of dots) and bars in red denote that a coefficient has a p-value less
than 0.05. The full regression table is presented in the Appendix.

Distance is quite small in absolute terms, the very small baseline probability of citing
any given case in the choice set makes relative changes the more appropriate tool
for considering substantive significance. An authoring judge who is perfectly aligned
with a precedent is 23% more likely to cite the precedent than a judge who is the
maximum distance away from a precedent. Even a less dramatic shift from one
standard deviation above the mean of Ideological Distance to one standard deviation
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Marginal Effect of a 1 S.D. increase
in Relative Distance
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Marginal Effect on Citation

0
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Marginal Effect of a 1 S.D. increase
in Ideological Distance
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0.8

−1.05

Baseline Ideological Distance
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−0.25
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Figure 3.3: Marginal Effects of Ideological Distance and Relative Distance on
Citation: These graphs provide the marginal effect of a one standard deviation
increase in Ideological Distance and Relative Distance in turn while holding all
other variables at their median. Marginal effects are calculated by estimating
the predicted probability of citation at a baseline value of the variable in
question and subtracting that from the predicted probability of citation when
the value of the variable is one standard deviation higher. The shaded regions
around each line delineate the 95% confidence intervals.

below the mean (i.e., closer to the precedent) increases the predicted probability of
citation by 10%.
The right panel of Figure 3.3 shows the marginal effect of Relative Distance when
Ideological Distance is set at its median. Although the 95% confidence interval comes
very close to zero, it does not actually include zero for any value of Relative Distance.
Moreover, further exploration reveals that the marginal effects of all values of Relative
Distance are statistically significant for values of Ideological Distance equal to or less
than 0.33 which includes for 52% of observations. The predicted probabilities plotted
in the right panel of Figure 3.4 show that the size of this impact is similar to that
of Ideological Distance. When the author’s Relative Distance to the precedent is one
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Figure 3.4: Effect of Ideological Distance and Relative Distance on Citation:
This graph provides the predicted probability of citation and 95% confidence
intervals at different values of Ideological Distance and Relative Distance in
turn. All other variables are held at their median.

standard deviation above the mean, they are 7% more likely to cite the precedent
than when Relative Distance is one standard deviation below the mean.
The control variables perform very similarly in the citation model here as they
do in the analogous citation model in Chapter 2. Precedents which are more similar
to the treatment case, precedents authored by the same judge as the treatment case,
and precedents which have been cited more frequently are more likely to be cited.
Per curiam precedents are less likely to be cited. When a judge has a greater number
of precedents to choose from the probability of any given case being cited decreases.
Finally, the curvilinear effect of age follows the anticipated pattern. One curious result
observed in Chapter 2 persists. Greater length of the precedent actually decreases
the probability of citation.
The next model explores the decision regarding whether to positively treat a
cited precedent. These results are presented in Figure 3.5. Although the coefficients
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for each of the constitutive terms are not statistically significant when the other
equals zero, the interaction term is both statistically significant and in the expected
direction. The marginal effects in Figure 3.6 show that both Ideological Distance
and Relative Distance also fail to gain statistical significance when the other (and all
control variables) are set at their median value.
Positive Treatment
Ideological Distance

●

Relative Distance

●

ID X Relative Distance
Top 1% Similarity
Same Author

●

Dissent (prec.)

●

Per curiam (prec.)

●

En banc (prec.)

●

Vitality
Total Citations
Total Treatments
Age
Age2

●

Length (prec.)

●

Prop. Quoted (prec.)
Length (treat.)
Intercept

−2

−1

0

1

Figure 3.5: Positive Treatment Model: Probit regression estimates of the effect
of Ideological Distance, Relative Distance, their interaction, and a range of
control variables on the decision to treat a cited precedent positively (or not).
Dots and diamonds indicate point estimates. Bars indicate 95% confidence
intervals. Diamonds (instead of dots) and bars in red denote that a coefficient
has a p-value less than 0.05. The full regression table is presented in the
Appendix.
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Figure 3.6: Marginal Effects of Ideological Distance and Relative Distance on
Positive Treatment: These graphs provide the marginal effect of a one standard
deviation increase in Ideological Distance and Relative Distance in turn while
holding all other variables at their median. Marginal effects are calculated by
estimating the predicted probability of positive treatment at a baseline value
of the variable in question and subtracting that from the predicted probability
of positive treatment when the value of the variable is one standard deviation
higher. The shaded regions around each line delineate the 95% confidence
intervals.

Figure 3.7 depicts the predicted probabilities of positive treatment over the entire
range of both Ideological Distance and Relative Distance from two slightly different
angles. The interaction effect causes the effect of Ideological Distance to change signs
as Relative Distance increases. When an author is closer to a precedent relative to the
circuit (towards the front of the figure) Ideological Distance has the usual negative
effect. Conversely, when the author is more distant from the precedent relative to the
circuit (towards the back of the figure), the author is more likely to positively treat
a precedent the farther away it is from their own ideal point. For further illustration
of the interaction effect, I display the change in predicted probability created by a
change in one variable from one standard deviation below the median to one standard
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deviation above the median for all values of the other variable (and the associated
95% confidence intervals). Figure 3.8 graphs the predicted probability of positive
treatment at the high value minus the predicted probability of positive treatment
at the low value for each variable over the entire range of the other constitutive
term. The results reveal the ranges over which a two standard deviation change is
statistically different from zero.
The left panel of Figure 3.8 demonstrates that when Ideological Distance is greater
than or equal to 0.6, Relative Distance has a significant, positive impact on positive
treatment. This region includes 21% of the data. The information in the right panel of
Figure 3.8 is particularly revealing. As expected when judges strategically anticipate
en banc review, the effect of Ideological Distance is substantially influenced by the
relative position of the circuit. For values of Relative Distance less than or equal to
-0.14, the effect of Ideological Distance is negative and has a bigger effect as Relative
Distance decreases. This range of the data accounts for 18% of observations. For
mid-range values of Relative Distance, the author’s distance to the precedent does
not have a statistically significant impact on the decision to positively treat a cited
precedent. Once the value of Relative Distance is equal to or greater than 0.55, the
effect of Ideological Distance is significant again, but has a positive effect. Within
this segment of the data (8% of all observations), an author who is farther from a
precedent is actually more likely to positively treat it. This effect size gets larger as
Relative Distance increases.
Since the options a judge faces in the treatment models include only cited cases,
it is feasible to consider effect size in absolute terms as well as relative terms. When
an author is the maximum distance from a precedent, the change in Relative Distance
from one standard deviation below to above the median increases the predicted probability of positive treatment from 6.1% to 8.4%. Similarly, at the maximum value
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Figure 3.7: Three Dimensional Predicted Probabilities-Positive Treatment:
This graph provide the predicted probability of positive treatment at different
values of Ideological Distance and Relative Distance presented at two slightly
different viewing angles. All other variables are held at their median.

of Relative Distance, a change in Ideological Distance from one standard deviation
below to above the median results in an increase in the predicted probability from
6.6% to 8.7%. At the other end of the scale, the same change in Ideological Distance
results in a decrease in the probability of positive treatment from 9.6% to 6.4%.
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Figure 3.8: Difference in Predicted Probability of Positive Treatment: The
left panel provides the difference in predicted probability of positive treatment when Relative Distance is one standard deviation above the median and
one standard deviation below the median for all possible values of Ideological
Distance. The right panel provides the difference in predicted probability of
positive treatment when Ideological Distance is one standard deviation above
and below the median for all possible values of Relative Distance. The shaded
regions depict the 95% confidence intervals. All control variables are held at
their median.

The control variables in the positive treatment model perform much the same
as they do in the analogous model in Chapter 2. While several are not statistically
significant, those which are tend to perform as expected. Cited precedents which have
a similarity score in the top one percent, have greater vitality, have been treated more
frequently, and are older are all more likely to be positively treated. A precedent being
cited more frequently actually decreases the probability of positive treatment slightly.
When the opinion in a treatment case is longer, positive treatment is more likely.
Most notably, an indicator of opinion quality, the proportion of text in the precedent
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which is quoted, increases the probability of positive treatment. This suggests that
authoring judges are more willing to expand the scope of higher quality precedents.
Now I move from examining the decision to expand the scope of a precedent to
the decision to restrict or narrow the scope of a precedent. Figure 3.9 contains the
starting point for this analysis, the model results for the negative treatment model.
Both Ideological Distance and Relative Distance are statistically significant and in
the expected direction, but the interaction term is not significant. When the author
and circuit are equidistant from a precedent, Ideological Distance has a positive effect
on negative treatment. Authoring judges who are more distant from a precedent
are more likely to treat it negatively. When an author is perfectly aligned with a
precedent, she is less likely to negatively treat a precedent when the circuit is closer
to it. Since neither of these situations is terribly common, I proceed to examine the
marginal effects and predicted probabilities of each of the constitutive terms when
the other is held at its median.
The marginal effects plotted in Figure 3.10 show that the effects of both constitutive terms observed when the other equals zero also hold true then the other is set at
its median. In fact, both effects are consistent over most of the range of the data. The
marginal effect of a one standard deviation increase in Ideological Distance is positive
and significant for all values of Relative Distance which are greater than or equal to
-0.38 which includes 93% of the data. Relative Distance is negative and significant
for all values of Ideological Distance equal to or less than 0.55 which describes 75%
of the data.
Not only are the marginal effects of the constitutive terms statistically significant
in most cases, but the effect sizes are substantively significant as well. Figure 3.11
graphs the predicted probability of negative treatment over the range of each constitutive term while holding the other (and all control variables) at their median. An
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Figure 3.9: Negative Treatment Model: Probit regression estimates of the effect of Ideological Distance, Relative Distance, their interaction, and a range
of control variables on the decision to treat a cited precedent negatively (or
not). Dots and diamonds indicate point estimates. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. Diamonds (instead of dots) and bars in red denote that a
coefficient has a p-value less than 0.05. The full regression table is presented
in the Appendix.

authoring judge who is aligned with a precedent only negatively treats a precedent
1.3% of the time, while an author the maximum distance from a precedent more than
doubles that rate, resorting to negative treatment for 2.7% of cited precedents. Relative Distance has a similar size effect. At the minimum value of Relative Distance the
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Figure 3.10: Marginal Effects of Ideological Distance and Relative Distance
on Negative Treatment: These graphs provide the marginal effect of a one
standard deviation increase in Ideological Distance and Relative Distance in
turn while holding all other variables at their median. Marginal effects are
calculated by estimating the predicted probability of negative treatment at
a baseline value of the variable in question and subtracting that from the
predicted probability of negative treatment when the value of the variable is
one standard deviation higher. The shaded regions around each line delineate
the 95% confidence intervals.

predicted probability is 2.4% and it drops to 1.1% at the maximum value of Relative
Distance.
In the negative treatment model most of the control variables are statistically
significant, just as they were in the negative treatment model in Chapter 2. Treatment
case-precedent pairs which are very similar are more likely to be treated negatively,
just as they are more likely to be treated positively. Also, precedents with a dissent,
precedents which have been treated more frequently, and older precedents are more
likely to be treated negatively. Precedents written by the same author, precedents
with greater Vitality, more heavily cited precedents, and longer precedents are all less
likely to be negatively treated.
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Figure 3.11: Effect of Ideological Distance and Relative Distance on Negative
Treatment: This graph provides the predicted probability of negative treatment and 95% confidence intervals at different values of Ideological Distance
and Relative Distance in turn. All other variables are held at their median.

3.5

Discussion

This study of the selection and use of binding circuit precedents in the U.S. Courts
of Appeals reveals that the ideological preferences of the entire circuit influence the
actions of panel opinion authors. For the decision of whether to positively treat a
cited precedent, the impact of an author’s ideology is conditioned on the location of
the circuit median. When the circuit is farther away from a precedent than the author
(Relative Distance ≤ -0.14), authors are less likely to positively treat precedents which
are farther away from them and this ideological effect is amplified when the circuit
is more distant. Conversely, when the author is far away from a precedent relative
to the circuit (Relative Distance ≥ .55), greater distance between the author and
a precedent actually increases the predicted probability of positive treatment. The
latter finding is consistent with authors expecting their circuit to apply heightened
scrutiny where there is greater ideological extremism. In other words, authors are
70

particularly careful to establish their adherence to stare decisis by positively treating
precedents which are farthest away from them when the circuit is most protective
(i.e., closer to the precedent). These patterns are consistent with the hypothesis that
judges strategically anticipate en banc review by moderating the extent to which they
rely on their own ideology when a circuit is more likely to be protective of a precedent
(because it reflects the circuit’s own preferences).
A more straightforward form strategic behavior occurs when the author of a panel
opinion makes a decision which is directly influenced by the location of the circuit as
a whole. The author’s citation-related decisions vary based on circuit preference even
when the overall impact of an author’s ideology may not depend on the location of
the circuit median. In all three models, the marginal effect of Relative Distance has
such an influence on authoring judges for at least some values of Ideological Distance.
When an author is deciding which precedents to cite, the marginal effect of Relative
Distance is significant and positive when the author is an average distance away from
the precedent or closer (Ideological Distance ≤ 0.33). Under these circumstances, a
judge is more likely to cite a case when the circuit is closer to the precedent (holding
the judge’s distance to the precedent constant). For the decision to positively treat,
Relative Distance also has a significant positive effect, but only when the author is
fairly far away from the precedent (Ideological Distance ≥ 0.6). Finally, for almost all
values of Ideological Distance (those less than or equal to 0.55), Relative Distance has
a negative marginal effect on negative treatment. Authors are less likely to negatively
treat precedents with which the circuit is more closely aligned.
The influential role of the circuit median in panel citation and treatment decisions
throws important light on the evidence of legal compliance uncovered in the previous
chapter. Taken together, these findings indicate what while circuit judges do show
respect for the doctrine of stare decisis, that respect is more pronounced when the
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circuit as a whole is ideologically motivated to enforce that norm by exercising its
power of en banc review. Examining the use of citations has provided leverage on
these important questions. Turning to more granular decisions than case outcomes
has provided evidence of strategic behavior even though the topic has generated mixed
results in the past.
It is important to bear in mind that evidence of strategic considerations playing
a role in citation and treatment of precedent does not mean that strategy is the only
driving force behind legal constraint. As scholars have noted, given the extent of professional socialization, judges may very well obtain significant utility from following
the law independent of the policy outcomes generated (Cross et al., 2010; Kim, 2006).
While this study looks for, and finds, evidence of strategic anticipation of en banc
review in the way circuit judges use precedent, other possible explanations for legal
constraint may very well play a role as well.
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3.6

Appendix
Intercept
Ideological Distance
Relative Distance
ID X RD
Top 1% Similarity Score
Same Author
Dissent
Per Curiam
En Banc
Vitality
Total Cites
Total Treatments
Age
Age2
Precedent Length
Proportion Quoted
Treatment case length
Size of Choice Set
Caseload
N

Coefficient
−0.934∗
−0.049∗
0.044∗
−0.028
1.747∗
0.121∗
0.000
−0.160∗
−0.067
0.006
0.020∗
0.009
−0.059∗
0.001∗
−0.096∗
0.077
−0.001
−0.113∗
0.000

Standard Error p-value
0.094
0.000
0.019
0.009
0.021
0.040
0.031
0.371
0.009
0.000
0.011
0.000
0.012
0.983
0.019
0.000
0.045
0.139
0.006
0.333
0.005
0.000
0.012
0.438
0.003
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.008
0.000
0.072
0.286
0.004
0.818
0.010
0.000
0.000
0.320
9,607,742

Table 3.3: Citation Model: Probit regression estimates of the effect of Ideological Distance, Relative Distance, their interaction, and a range of control
variables on the decision of whether to cite a precedent. The reported standard errors are robust standard errors which are clustered on the precedent
and * denotes a p-value less than 0.05.
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Coefficient
Intercept
−1.820∗
Ideological Distance
−0.060
Relative Distance
−0.096
ID X RD
0.311∗
Top 1% Similarity Score
0.445∗
Same Author
−0.036
Dissent
0.021
Per Curiam
0.027
En Banc
0.058
Vitality
0.054∗
Total Cites
−0.009∗
Total Treatments
0.032∗
Age
0.010∗
Age2
0.000
Precedent Length
−0.009
Proportion Quoted
1.119∗
Treatment case length
0.045∗
N

Standard Error p-value
0.146
0.000
0.046
0.193
0.051
0.063
0.091
0.001
0.018
0.000
0.031
0.239
0.024
0.387
0.049
0.584
0.056
0.299
0.006
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.006
0.000
0.004
0.004
0.000
0.978
0.015
0.531
0.154
0.000
0.014
0.001
39,498

Table 3.4: Positive Treatment Model: Probit regression estimates of the effect
of Ideological Distance, Relative Distance, their interaction, and a range of
control variables on the decision to treat a cited precedent positively (or not).
The reported standard errors are robust standard errors which are clustered
on the precedent and * denotes a p-value less than 0.05.
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Coefficient
Intercept
−1.699∗
Ideological Distance
0.233∗
Relative Distance
−0.207∗
ID X RD
0.165
Top 1% Similarity Score
0.574∗
Same Author
−0.178∗
Dissent
0.155∗
Per Curiam
0.053
En Banc
−0.046
Vitality
−0.072∗
Total Cites
−0.014∗
Total Treatments
0.086∗
Age
0.026∗
Age2
0.000∗
Precedent Length
−0.100∗
Proportion Quoted
0.037
Treatment case length
0.031
N

Standard Error p-value
0.191
0.000
0.059
0.000
0.068
0.002
0.121
0.173
0.027
0.000
0.048
0.000
0.030
0.000
0.058
0.360
0.071
0.518
0.010
0.000
0.004
0.002
0.012
0.000
0.006
0.000
0.000
0.047
0.021
0.000
0.209
0.860
0.019
0.103
39,498

Table 3.5: Negative Treatment Model: Probit regression estimates of the effect
of Ideological Distance, Relative Distance, their interaction, and a range of
control variables on the decision to treat a cited precedent negatively (or not).
The reported standard errors are robust standard errors which are clustered
on the precedent and * denotes a p-value less than 0.05.
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Chapter 4
The Impact of Federal Courts on
State Policy Diffusion

The influence U.S. Courts of Appeals exercise over the development of law is not
only widespread, but varied. In this chapter I turn away from the direct examination
of how circuit judges impact and are influenced by circuit case law to consider the role
both circuit courts and the U.S. Supreme Court play in the formation and diffusion
of state policies. The federal constitution sets minimum requirements for protections
all state governments must provide. Federal judges are typically the final arbiters of
whether state legislation complies with the U.S. Constitution. I explore the extent
to which state legislators react to such rulings when considering the adoption and
formulation of policies.
There is evidence that the federal government influences state policy diffusion
(Allen, Pettus and Haider-Markel, 2004; Berry and Berry, 1990; Grossback, NicholsonCrotty and Peterson, 2004; Karch, 2012; Roh and Haider-Markel, 2003; Welch and
Thompson, 1980) and also that both state supreme courts (Langer and Brace, 2005)
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and the U.S. Supreme Court (Patton, 2007) play a role in this process. These findings
indicate that the influence of the federal government may also be brought to bear
through the circuit courts. States face considerable federal restrictions on the policies
they are permitted to implement (Welch and Thompson, 1980: 717). There is an
appeal as a matter of right to the federal circuit courts (Giles et al., 2007: 451),
so any challenge to a state policy in federal court has a substantial chance of being
ultimately resolved by a circuit court. Since there are multiple states in each federal
circuit, a state may learn valuable information from the rulings on a policy from
another state in its own circuit. Consequently, a thorough examination of the effect
of federal courts on state policy diffusion requires looking at circuit courts as well as
the Supreme Court.
Important methodological advances in recent policy diffusion literature enable
more nuanced analysis of the mechanisms behind policy diffusion (Boehmke, 2009a;
Karch, 2007b). The empirical analysis in this chapter utilizes a dyadic approach first
deployed in the policy diffusion context by Volden (2006). The unit of analysis is a
dyad of states in each year with the dyad composed of a potential adopter, Statei ,
and a previous adopter, Statej . This approach makes it possible to model not only
the characteristics of the potential adopter, but also characteristics of each previous
adopter, characteristics of the previously adopted policy, and aspects of the relationship between the two states. When a previously adopted policy has been examined
by the federal courts, the results provide potential adopters with valuable information
about risks associated with adopting such a policy. The dyadic data structure allows
me to evaluate the impact of such information while accounting for the source and
type of any relevant federal court rulings. The source of rulings is important because
Supreme Court rulings should have a similar strong effect nationwide while circuit
rulings provide the most information to states located within that circuit. Whether
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a policy is ruled constitutional or unconstitutional is similarly crucial to how a ruling
influences policy diffusion.
In addition to taking a dyadic approach, I follow the example of Brinks and
Coppedge (2006) and perform a two stage analysis to examine the influence of federal
court rulings on both the adoption and content of a policy. First, I explore a potential
adopter’s decision regarding whether to adopt or amend a policy previously adopted
by Statej in a given year, t. Second, if Statei does legislate in year t, I model the
extent to which the text of its new statute overlaps with the text of previously adopted
policies. A particularly efficient way for states to utilize the information in court
rulings is to directly adopt statutory language the courts have approved or explicitly
avoid language which has been struck down. I find evidence that Supreme Court
rulings that a previously adopted statute is constitutional influence the adoption of a
policy, and circuit court rulings that a previously adopted policy is unconstitutional
can significantly decrease the extent of policy overlap.
This chapter builds on recent policy diffusion work examining the mechanisms
behind diffusion by looking beyond the effects of the mere existence of preexisting
policies to evaluate the impact of such policies conditional on their success in federal
courts. While measuring the success of public policies is often a very difficult task,
how well a policy fares in terms of federal constitutional challenges lends itself to
empirical examination which helps us better understand the role of an important
multi-jurisdictional actor, the federal government. In addition to shedding light on
the role federal courts play in how and why state policies diffuse, this study illustrates
a technique for evaluating similarity in the content of policies which can be applied to
answer a wide range of other questions about the mechanisms behind policy diffusion.
This novel measure of policy content overlap holds particular promise because it
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provides a more direct measurement of the influence of previous adopters than simply
looking at the binary choice over whether to adopt a policy.

4.1

State Policy Diffusion and Federal Courts

The states have long been described as laboratories of democracy where innovative
public policies can be developed and tested (see, e.g. Boeckelman, 1992). For decades
scholars have worked towards developing a better understanding of the forces which
shape and drive this process (Walker, 1969; Gray, 1973; Berry and Berry, 1990; Allen,
Pettus and Haider-Markel, 2004; Berry and Berry, 2007; Karch, 2007b). In 1969
Walker posited that states have an important influence on each other in the process
of policy innovation resulting in a pattern of proliferation of policies across states.
Since then many scholars have presented evidence that diffusion plays a role in state
policy innovation (Allen, Pettus and Haider-Markel, 2004; Berry and Berry, 1990;
Bouché and Volden, 2011; Gray, 1973; Mooney and Lee, 1995). Recent scholarly
work has increasingly investigated the underlying mechanisms which drive observed
patterns of policy diffusion including learning, competition, socialization, and coercion
(Boehmke and Witmer, 2004; Glick, 2011; Graham, Shipan and Volden, 2008; Karch,
2007b; Pacheco, 2012; Shipan and Volden, 2008).
One of the foundational observations of early policy diffusion work was that a
policy is more likely to diffuse to neighboring1 states (Walker, 1969). For years scholars uncovered evidence that previous adoptions of several policy types increase the
likelihood nearby states would adopt similar policies (Walker, 1969; Gray, 1973 (education, welfare, and civil rights); Berry and Berry, 1990 (lotteries); Mooney and Lee,
1

“Neighboring” states are typically operationalized as those which are geographically contiguous
(Berry and Berry, 2007: 244).
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1995 (abortion regulation); Andrews, 2000 (electricity deregulation); Allen, Pettus
and Haider-Markel, 2004 (partial birth abortion bans, truth-in-sentencing laws, and
hate crime laws)). One theoretical reason for such neighbor effects is that states
learn from one another’s experiences (Berry and Berry, 2007: 225). The risk of policy failure is one of the obstacles to innovation, and if there are other similar states
that have enacted similar policies, that provides information which reduces the risk
of innovation (Mooney and Lee, 1995: 605). Available examples of a policy’s impact
in another state are a relatively low-cost way of ascertaining information sufficient to
get a policy enacted (Berry and Berry, 1990: 84). While this information could be obtained from any previous adopter, scholars explain neighbor effects by theorizing that
state policymakers are more likely to be aware of the details of policy implementation
in their neighbor states. Moreover, the experience of a neighboring state in enacting
and implementing a policy might very well provide more relevant information than
the experience of a state in a different part of the country.
Current work on policy diffusion has taken important steps toward understanding
both when and why policymakers might be influenced by their neighbors rather than
simply treating neighbor effects as single unconditional force (Baybeck, Berry and
Siegel, 2011; Boehmke and Witmer, 2004; Bouché and Volden, 2011; Gilardi, Füglister
and Luyet, 2009). Much of this progress has been made possible due to methodological
advancements. Volden (2006) incorporated a dyadic approach used in the study of
international relations to study diffusion by looking at pairs of states rather than just
the decision of a single state. This groundbreaking approach paved the way to study
policy convergence between two states while accounting for features of both states
individually and their relationship.
Studying dyads of states has enabled scholars to investigate a range of new questions generated by the traditional understanding of the reasons for neighbor effects
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(Gilardi and Füglister, 2008; Strebel and Widmer, 2012). The theory that learning
drives policy diffusion prompted scholars to incorporate measures of policy success
into their analyses. As expected, policies which are more successful are more likely to
be emulated (Gilardi, Füglister and Luyet, 2009; Gilardi and Füglister, 2008; Shipan
and Volden, 2010; Volden, 2006). Also, states are more likely to adopt policies which
converge with the policy in another state when the two states are more similar ideologically (Baybeck, Berry and Siegel, 2011; Gilardi, 2010; Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty
and Peterson, 2004). While both of these findings are suggested by some of the original explanations for neighbor effects, neither exclusively predicts that only neighbors
will have such an effect.
This chapter focuses on another aspect of policy diffusion which may contribute
to the appearance of neighbor effects-the influence of federal courts. While the effect
neighbors have on state policy diffusion has received considerable attention in the
scholarly literature, the impact of courts in general has received less attention. The
impact of federal circuit courts in particular has not been addressed. I examine the
influence of circuit courts as well as the Supreme Court. Incorporating circuit courts
into the analysis is important for two reasons. First, while the circuit courts are studied considerably less than the Supreme Court, they exert an important influence due
to the large number of cases in which they have the final word (Boyd and Spriggs,
2009; Cross, 2007; Hettinger, Lindquist and Martinek, 2006; Klein, 2002; Songer,
Sheehan and Haire, 2000). Considering the extent to which this significant, but often
overlooked, force might be influencing state legislators is important to a more complete and nuanced understanding of the way state governments operate within the
context of federalism. The second reason including circuit courts is important arises
due to the fact that they are arranged by geographical jurisdiction over groups of con-
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tiguous states as illustrated in Figure 4.1. Because of this configuration, observations
of regional diffusion of policy potentially conflate neighbor effects and circuit effects.
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Figure 4.1: Map of the U.S. Courts of Appeals

Scholars have examined the role of various multi-jurisdictional actors in policy
diffusion including the role of the federal government (Karch, 2012; Strebel, 2011;
Welch and Thompson, 1980). Various branches of the federal government and various levels of those branches may exert such an influence (Berry and Berry, 1990;
Boushey, 2012; Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty and Peterson, 2004; Karch, 2012, 2007b;
Roh and Haider-Markel, 2003). The primary source of influence the federal government exerts over states is the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.
No state has the power to pass laws which contravene either the federal constitution
or federal statutes or treaties. Both the power and scope of the federal government
have expanded over the course of the nation’s history with the result that today states
face considerable federal restrictions on the policies they are permitted to implement
(Welch and Thompson, 1980: 717). Moreover, the influence of the federal government extends beyond the effect of the compulsory supremacy of federal law. Even in
those remaining areas where the federal government does not directly restrict state
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policymaking, it is still able to effectively influence state policy (Allen, Pettus and
Haider-Markel, 2004). Welch and Thompson (1980) examine this sort of indirect influence by the federal government and find evidence that “incentives provided by the
federal government do stimulate the diffusion of policies through the states” (727).
While there are some policy areas the states control largely without interference by
the federal government (Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty and Peterson, 2004), the number of ways the federal government can and does interject itself into matters of state
policy lends considerable significance to questions related to federal influences over
state policy.
Federal courts are frequently the mechanism through which the supremacy of
federal law is established. Moreover, research shows that the impact of courts is not
limited to the direct impact of specific court decisions after a policy has been enacted,
challenged, and litigated (Langer and Brace, 2005: 317). There is evidence that courts
play a role at the stage of policy consideration and adoption; state policymakers take
into account the possibility that a policy might be stuck down. Patton (2007) studied
the effect of the U.S. Supreme Court and found evidence that policies which the Court
had indicated were on shaky constitutional ground were less likely to be adopted by
states than policies the Court had not addressed at all or had ruled constitutional.
Another study found evidence that state policymakers rely on knowledge about the
ideological makeup of their state supreme court and the likelihood a statute will be
challenged in that forum to inform their decision about whether or not to adopt a
particular policy (Langer and Brace, 2005: 318).
There are good reasons why state policymakers pay attention to the proclivities
of the courts which might rule on a policy after it is adopted. The most obvious is the
possibility that a policy will be stuck down. Whether state legislators’ motivations
for enacting a policy are substantive (they truly believe that the policy is what is
83

best for the state) or political (they believe supporting the policy will help get them
re-elected), neither goal is served very effectively if the policy is struck down by the
courts. Enacting policies takes considerable expenditure of limited political resources
(Boushey, 2010; Karch, 2012). Therefore, legislators have incentive to avoid adopting
policies that are at a high risk of being struck down.2 In order to husband scarce
resources, state policymakers are motivated to anticipate how the courts are likely to
treat a potential policy (Langer and Brace, 2005: 319).
State legislators should have just as much motivation to pay attention to the
potential actions of their federal circuit court as they do the U.S. Supreme Court or
their state supreme court. All the concerns about a policy being overturned remain
the same, plus there are other factors at work in the dynamic between states and
federal circuit courts which provide additional incentives. If there is a potential
challenge to a policy based on federal law, the chances that a challenge will make it
all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court are fairly low. But if any person or entity
challenges the policy in federal court, there is an appeal as of right to the federal
circuit court (Giles et al., 2007: 451) which means there is a very good chance the
federal circuit court will weigh in on the issue. Langer and Brace (2005) show in their
work on state supreme courts that the attention state policymakers pay to a court
is greater if it is more likely the court will rule on a policy. Consequently, it makes
sense to expect that state policymakers pay attention to their federal circuit court’s
likely treatment of a policy.
The institutional structure of the circuit courts provides a unique opportunity
for state legislators to gain information about how the court would rule on a policy
before they adopt it. This dynamic arises from the fact that each federal circuit
2

This is not to say that there are never equally or more powerful incentives from other quarters
which would militate in favor of adopting policies in spite of a high risk of being stuck down.
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contains multiple states. A ruling issued by a federal circuit court is binding on
all future cases that arise in that circuit (Cross, 2003; Klein, 2002; Landes, Lessig
and Solimine, 1998; Lee III, 2003; Lindquist and Cross, 2005; Merritt, 1990; O’Hara,
1993). Once a policy has been adopted by one state in a federal circuit, any ruling
on that policy will be applicable to the other states in that circuit (it they adopt a
sufficiently similar policy). This affects the cost of adopting a policy. After a policy
has been adopted by another state in the same circuit, any resulting litigation will
reduce the risk and uncertainty for subsequent adopters. This dynamic is not present
when policymakers consider how their state supreme court would rule because they
do not have the option to sit back and wait to see how the court would rule on a
particular type of policy.

4.2

A Theory of Federal Court Effects

The idea that political subdivisions within a federal system of government act as
policy laboratories suggests that the effects of implementing different kinds of polices
in one context provides valuable information for future policy decisions (Karch, 2007a;
Volden, 2006). While scholars have frequently opined that states learn from each
other’s experiences, factoring actual success or failure of previously adopted policies
into empirical analysis of policy diffusion has been undertaken in only a handful
of recent studies (Gilardi, Füglister and Luyet, 2009; Gilardi and Füglister, 2008;
Neumayer and Plümper, 2012; Volden, 2006). This element is key to understanding
learning as a mechanism of policy diffusion. The mere adoption of a policy in another
state is not necessarily enough to expect other states to adopt it as well. Valuable
information comes from observing how well a policy works.
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The federal courts have the potential to effect the success or failure of certain state
policies in a unique way which is inherently related to, although not synonymous with,
the policy’s ultimate success in terms of policymakers’ goals. When a federal court
upholds a state statute as constitutional, the law meets a critical threshold which is a
necessary precondition for the policy to be a success down the road. In other words,
the policy’s survival (of federal scrutiny) is key to there even being a possibility
of success. On the other hand, a court ruling that a state law is unconstitutional
is a direct indication of policy failure. Even if the court strikes down only a part
or particular application of a law, that is a concrete indication that policymakers’
intentions and efforts were thwarted.
When a potential adopter, Statei , is considering the information available about a
policy previously enacted by Statej , federal court rulings either declaring the statute,
P olicyj , constitutional or unconstitutional are important signals. The relative importance of these signals will depend on the identity of the federal court issuing the
ruling. Such rulings may come from the U.S. Supreme Court or the U.S. Courts of
Appeals.3 If Statei and Statej are both in the same federal circuit, circuit court
rulings are more important because they are binding as a matter of law4 whereas a
ruling on a policy from a state in a different circuit would not be binding in Circuiti if
Statei chose to adopt such a policy. Since federal circuits are arranged geographically,
this dynamic may contribute to observed neighbor effects.
3

I do not consider rulings issued by U.S. District Courts for two reasons. First, any ruling
regarding the constitutionality of Statej ’s policy issued at the trial court level is not binding in any
other state. Second, since there is an appeal as of right and cases involving the constitutionality of
statutes are inherently high stakes cases, most litigation from the district courts will be appealed to
the circuit level.
4

Only published opinions issued in a federal circuit are binding under the doctrine of stare decisis.
However, as a practical matter when a court rules on the constitutionality (or unconstitutionality)
of a state law the opinion is virtually always deemed important enough to warrant publishing the
opinion.
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Current research using directed dyadic analysis for studying policy diffusion has
emphasized its utility for modeling characteristics of the relationship between a potential and previous adopter and characteristics of each state (Gilardi and Füglister,
2008; Gilardi, 2010; Volden, 2006). I extend this approach a step further to explicitly
address characteristics of the previously adopted policy itself. Specifically, I utilize
the dyadic framework to develop a theory of how the treatment of P olicyj in federal
courts influences Statei ’s policy decisions. I consider both how different types of court
rulings influence the decision to pass legislation and, if such legislation is passed, how
much the text directly reflects the content of Statej ’s previously enacted law.
This two stage approach addresses the need, discussed by several scholars, to look
beyond the binary decision to adopt a policy and incorporate an evaluation of the
content of adopted policies as well (Boehmke and Witmer, 2004; Boehmke, 2009a;
Brinks and Coppedge, 2006; Glick, 2011; Karch, 2012, 2007b; Shipan and Volden,
2012; Strebel and Widmer, 2012; Taylor et al., 2012; Volden, 2006). Simply adopting
the same kind of policy enacted in another state does not guarantee that the policy
is exactly the same (Karch, 2007b). Nor does it necessarily indicate that Statej was
the source of the idea or information behind Statei ’s decision (Volden, Ting and
Carpenter, 2008). Going beyond the binary decision to adopt a policy to examine
the extent to which it overlaps with the text of P olicyj provides important additional
insight. The nature of language is such that an idea can be expressed in a nearly
infinite number of ways. As a result, the appearance of the same phrases in two
policies is not likely to happen coincidentally. Overlap in the actual text used in
legislation helps trace the flow of ideas in a more definitive way than just two states
adopting the same policy.
When Statei decides whether to adopt a policy with federal implications that has
previously been adopted by Statej , federal court treatments are likely to influence
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that decision. The extent and direction of the influence will depend on the source
and type of any court rulings. Rulings that P olicyj is constitutional handed down by
either the Supreme Court or the circuit in which Statei is located should increase the
probability that Statei will adopt5 the same kind of policy as Statej .6 Constitutional
rulings from a different circuit may have a smaller positive effect or no effect at all.
The effect of unconstitutional rulings on the decision to adopt is somewhat ambiguous. At first glance it may appear that such decisions should decrease the chance
of Statei adopting the policy in place in Statej . However, a court decision ruling a
statute unconstitutional will often provide substantial information about the particular defects of the statute under consideration including a discussion of how to cure
such defects. The availability of this kind of information may increase the ability of
Statei to adopt a policy which can survive constitutional review. On the other hand,
the mere fact of a policy being struck down may discourage Statei from passing a
similar law. These two types of effects also might work at cross-purposes, perhaps
resulting in a net appearance of no effect. Due to these ambiguities, I do not have
any theoretical expectations regarding the effect of unconstitutional rulings on the
decision to adopt.
The ambiguity about how unconstitutional rulings might influence the decision to
adopt a policy highlights another benefit of examining the extent of policy convergence in the actual content of the adopted policy. For the extent of policy overlap,
I expect rulings that P olicyj is constitutional or unconstitutional to have opposing
effects. When a particular statute has been declared constitutional and another state
5

I use the term “adopt” to denote any legislation in a given policy area. In other words, I use it
broadly to refer to both initial adoptions and subsequent amendments.
6

This, and other, hypothesized federal court effects may be dampened to the extent that potential
adopters have no interest in passing a particular type of policy. Nevertheless, the anticipated patterns
should emerge in the aggregate.
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decides to adopt the same policy, borrowing the text of the approved statute is an
efficient means to reduce the risk of future federal court interference. Conversely, unconstitutional rulings are a clear signal for subsequent adopters to avoid (or at least
alter in significant ways) the text of the preexisting statute. I expect the effect size to
be most notable for Supreme Court rulings or those from the same circuit as Statei .
These and the forgoing hypotheses are summarized in Table 4.1.7

Decision to Adopt
Policyj Ruled Constitutional
Supreme Court
+
Same Circuit
+
Different Circuit
+ or n.s.
Policyj Ruled Unconstitutional
Supreme Court
+ or - or n.s.
Same Circuit
+ or - or n.s.
Different Circuit
+ or - or n.s.

Extent of Policy Overlap
+
+
+ or n.s.
- or n.s.

Table 4.1: Hypothesized sign for key explanatory variables.

4.3

Data and Research Design

I test the forgoing hypotheses using data from two broad issue areas, abortion
and election law. Both of these issues provide contexts with substantial federal constitutional implications, while offering variation on the important dimension of issue
7

One may wonder if the hypothesized patterns could also be generated by outside forces influencing both federal courts and state policymakers. In addition to controlling for such factors to
the extent possible in my empirical models, there is further reason to expect that such endogeneity
is not a problem. The time which necessarily elapses between implementation of a statute and a
court’s final ruling on its constitutionality means that each policy is typically considered by potential adopters before a court ruling as well as after any such rulings. Consequently, any change in
behavior by potential adopters is not likely to be due to unmeasured differences between policies
which courts rule on and those which they do not.
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salience. There is evidence that issue salience affects the process of policy diffusion
(Nicholson-Crotty, 2009), so looking at both types of policies enables the comparison
of the high salience issue of abortion regulation with the less salient topic of election law. In addition to directly testing my hypotheses about the effects of federal
courts, I also conduct a supplemental analysis of policy diffusion in family law, an
area traditionally left almost exclusively to state governments, to provide a point of
comparison to the diffusion of policies with federal implications.
Studies of policy diffusion have long broken broad topic areas down into subtopics
which cover comparable policies. Following previous research on abortion policies I
gather data on six distinct types of policies: (1) bans of partial-birth abortions, (2)
requirement of parental consent for a minor’s abortion, (3) requirement of parental
notice for a minor’s abortion, (4) restriction on use of public funding for abortions, (5)
imposition of a waiting period between informed consent and an abortion procedure,
and (6) restrictions on post-viability abortions. For each subtopic I collected every
applicable statute in all 50 states from 1973 to 2010. Within the issue areas of
election and family law I collected one subtopic each due to the challenges involved
with sufficiently isolating discrete, readily identifiable, subtopics. The data include all
laws regarding voter qualifications and grounds for divorce passed from 1990 to 2010.8
Table 4.2 provides the number of each type of policy enacted during the relevant time
frame.
Abortion policies compose a substantial portion of my data because it is an issue
area which works well for evaluating the role of federal court effects on state policy diffusion. First, the role of the federal government is prominent. Since Roe v.
8

While 1973 provides a natural starting point for collecting abortion legislation (since it marks
the beginning of federal involvement), there is no similar obvious starting point for the election and
family law policies. Twenty years proved to be a sufficient time frame for these topics to include an
average of at least 1.5 policies per state.
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Topic

Subtopic
Number of Laws
Partial Birth
35
Parental Consent
36
Abortion
Parental Notice
31
Public Funding
27
Waiting Period
29
Post-Viability
20
Election Law Voter Qualifications
119
Family Law
Grounds for Divorce
75
Table 4.2: Breakdown of Policies by Topic and Subtopic

Wade was decided in 1973, state abortion regulations are clearly restricted by federal
constitutional law. When a state passes a law regulating abortion, interference by
the federal courts is a very real possibility. Second, the field of abortion regulation is
sufficiently complex that there is frequently uncertainty about which abortion-related
policies will be deemed unconstitutional by the federal courts and which will be upheld. The Supreme Court has not hastened to clear up every possible issue and even
the concerns they have addressed often take considerable time before there is a definitive ruling. As a result, a variety of legal issues related to state abortion policy are
decided by federal circuit courts and either never make it to the Supreme Court or
take some time getting there. These features combine to provide sufficient variability
in the data to test my hypotheses. Furthermore, the inclusion of voter qualification
laws in the study helps mitigate concerns about the ability to generalize the results
here to other issue areas.
I examine two aspects of the policy process. The first step is looking at what drives
the decision to adopt or amend a policy. This analysis is conducted using a conditional
dyadic event history model (Boehmke, 2009b; Shipan and Volden, 2010). Modeling
the decision of a state regarding whether to adopt a policy in a given year has been
the standard approach to policy diffusion studies since Berry and Berry’s watershed
91

1990 article analyzing the diffusion of state lotteries (Jones and Branton, 2005; Karch,
2007b; Graham, Shipan and Volden, 2008).9 A dyadic event history model is a more
recent development which models a dyad of two states in a given year (Boehmke,
2009b; Gilardi, 2010; Gilardi and Füglister, 2008; Shipan and Volden, 2010; Volden,
2006). Using this approach, I model whether a potential adopter, Statei , decides
to adopt a policy currently enacted by a previous adopter, Statej , in a given year.
This enables the use of explanatory variables for attributes of Statei , Statej , the law
previously adopted by Statej , and the relationship between the two states.
The second step of my analysis focuses on states which choose to adopt or amend
a policy and examines what factors influence the content of the new policy. One of
the key limits of policy diffusion studies to date has been the lack of attention to
the content of legislation (Brinks and Coppedge, 2006). Scholars have increasingly
worked towards finding ways to incorporate more information about the nature of
policies into quantitative models. Advances in computational text analysis offer the
opportunity for further progress in this vein. Specifically, plagiarism software has
been used to quantify the overlap in two documents (Corley, Collins and Calvin,
2011; Corley, 2008). I utilize this tool to generate a form of outcome variable new
to policy diffusion research, the percentage of text in a law adopted by Statei which
overlaps with a statute previously enacted by Statej .10 As in the first step of my
analysis, I use a dyadic model.
9

For more extensive discussion of the use of event history models in state policy diffusion research,
see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004, 1997.
10

This outcome variable is generated using WCopyfind 4.1.1 software with the same settings
employed by Corley (2008). The software counts all phrases in P olicyi which are at least six words
long and match a phrase in P olicyj with no more than two imperfections. The matching process
disregards numbers, case, and outer punctuation.
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The unit of analysis for both stages is the Statei -Statej dyad in year t. For the first
stage I incorporate observations for every Statei in year t paired with every Statej
which had the relevant policy type in place in year t − 1. Such dyads are included
for each of the policy subtopics. I include only comparisons to previous adopters for
both methodological and substantive reasons. Boehmke (2009) warns that including all dyad-year combinations may bias the results. Moreover, the question I am
investigating is how variation in federal court treatment of previous legislation influences subsequent policy decisions. The impact of another state’s legislative inaction
is not the focus of my inquiry. The second stage of analysis includes all dyad-year
observations from the first stage in which Statei adopted a new policy in year t.
Since the outcome variable in the first stage is the binary determination of whether
Statei has taken legislative action on a policy previously adopted by Statej , I use a
probit model.11 The outcome in the second stage is the percentage of text in Statei ’s
new legislation which overlaps with the text in Statej ’s policy. Although this continuous variable is theoretically bounded by zero and one hundred, I model it using a
linear model.12 One challenge created by dyadic analysis is that it introduces complex
interdependencies into the data. In order to address this concern, I estimate robust
standard errors clustered on Statei and year t (Bouché and Volden, 2011; Makse
and Volden, 2011).13 Another potential concern is that a two-stage decisionmaking
process sometimes raises the problem of correlated residuals between the two stages
biasing the estimates at the second stage (Heckman, 1979). In this case, estimation of
11

Alternative functional forms including logit, complementary log-log, and rare events logit all
lead to the same substantive conclusions.
12

Model diagnostics indicate that this approach is not particularly problematic, and only 0.6% of
the fitted values fall outside of the zero to one hundred interval.
13

Clustering only on Statei and including either year dummies or variables for time and time
squared both lead to substantially similar results.
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these two stages in a Heckman selection model does not reveal significant correlation
between the two stages (p-value of ρ is 0.173).
The key explanatory variables (and most of the control variables) are the same for
both the adoption and policy overlap models. I incorporate six variables which contain
counts of the two types of court treatments, constitutional and unconstitutional, from
the three possible types of courts, the Supreme Court, the same circuit as Statei ,
and a different circuit from Statei . These data were compiled using information
obtained from Shepard’s Citations. While this legal publication is more commonly
used by political science scholars to track subsequent treatment of case law, Shepard’s
provides analogous information for statutes as well. For each policy in my dataset
I obtained a list of all Supreme Court and circuit court citations to the statute in
question and further narrowed this list to contain only specific rulings that a statute
was constitutional or unconstitutional.14
Using the year of citation, court, and type of treatment obtained from Shepard’s,
I compiled counts of the six types of court treatments for each dyad-year in my data.
For example, the variable Supreme Court - Constitutional is a count of the number
of times the U.S. Supreme Court had ruled that P olicyj was constitutional between
the year Statej adopted the law and year t − 1. The circuit court counts follow the
same overall pattern with the exception that a circuit court treatment is dropped out
of the count after the Supreme Court has ruled on the same statute. For example, if
Statej adopted a policy in 1995, the circuit ruled it unconstitutional in 1997, and the
Supreme Court affirmed that the law is unconstitutional in 1999, the circuit treatment
is only counted for dyads in the years 1998 and 1999. Once there is a Supreme Court
ruling on the statute, that treatment overrides previous circuit rulings.
14

All relevant circuit court rulings are published.
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In addition to testing the effect of federal court treatment, I also control for a
variety of other factors which may influence the process of policy diffusion. Since
I model both the initial adoption of policies and subsequent amendments, I include
a control for whether Statei had a particular type of policy in existence in year
t − 1. When Existing Statutei equals one, any legislation adopted by Statei in year t
amends or replaces another policy rather than instituting it for the first time. Another
important feature to account for is whether the policy in question is one of the policies
related to abortion regulation.15
There is extensive literature addressed to the impact of the internal characteristics
of a state on its policy innovation. Berry and Berry (1990) point out that research on
diffusion must take such factors into account in order to make any valid claims about
diffusion of policy. Consequently, I include controls for a number of characteristics
of Statei including state government ideology, the level of legislative professionalism,
whether it is an election year, the state population, and its per capita income.16 I
rescale both P opulationi and Per Capita Income i by dividing them by 10,000.
The dyadic nature of the models makes it possible to also account for the impact
of a number of important features of the relationship between Statei and Statej . The
most immediately interesting such features are whether the two states in the dayd are
in the same circuit and whether they are neighbors. While I do not necessarily expect
states in the same circuit to exercise additional influence beyond that explained by
15

Including separate dummy variables for all but one of the specific policy subtypes does not
substantially change the results.
16

The government ideology scores are Berry, Ringquist, Fording and Hanson’s NOMINATE measure of state government ideology which are available at: http://rcfording.wordpress.com/
state-ideology-data/ (accessed March 10, 2013). I use the Squire index to measure legislative
professionalism (Squire, 2007). The data for the remaining variables were obtained from datasets
made available by Carl Klarner at: http://www.indstate.edu/polisci/klarnerpolitics.htm
(accessed March 10, 2013).
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actual court treatments, it is still important to account for this possibility. I also
control for the similarity between Statei and Statej in terms of government ideology,
size, and income. Government ID Difference captures the absolute difference between
the ideology scores for the state governments of Statei and Statej . I use the ratio of
population and per capita income in Statei to that in Statej to track demographic
similarities. When these ratios are greater than one, that reflects that the numbers
are larger for Statei than for Statej .
Finally, there are attributes of previously adopted laws which are important to
take into account. The age of a preexisting law may very well influence how much
Statei will pay attention to it. Therefore, the age of P olicyj is included in both stages
of the analysis. Also, the measurement of the percentage of overlapping text in the
second model may be somewhat dependent on the length of both the law adopted by
Statei and Statej ’s previously adopted law. Consequently, I include controls for the
natural log of the word count of both documents in the second stage of the analysis.
Table 4.3 shows a summary of the outcome variables and the federal court treatment explanatory variables for the policies which have federal implications. There are
a total of 146,412 dyads in the first stage model. Statei chose to adopt the relevant
policy type in a little over three percent of those cases. In those 4,832 cases, the average amount of the text in the adopted policy which overlaps the text from P olicyj
is about 12%. The counts for the federal court treatment variables range from zero
to two, and Table 4.3 shows the distribution of these values for the full dataset used
in the first stage of the model.
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Policy Adopted
S.Ct. - Const.
S.Ct. - Unconst.
Same Cir. - Const.
Same Cir. - Unconst.
Diff. Cir. - Const.
Diff. Cir. - Unconst.
Percentage Overlap

0
141,580
140,189
140,434
145,869
145,623
139,801
138,185
Mean
12.34

1
4,832
5,243
4,949
543
600
6,611
6,456
Std. Dev.
20.75

2
n.a.
980
1,029
0
189
0
1,771
Med.
1

Table 4.3: Summary Statistics for Policies with Federal Implications

4.4

Results

My analysis begins with an examination of abortion and election law policies.17
The first model is presented in Figure 4.2 and examines the effect of federal court
rulings regarding previously adopted state policies on the decision of other states
to adopt the same type of policy. The only type of court rulings which have a
statistically significant impact are rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court declaring a state
law constitutional. When a previously adopted statute has survived scrutiny from
the highest court in the federal judicial hierarchy other states are more likely to adopt
the same kind of policy. When there are no federal rulings on the constitutionality of
Statej ’s previously adopted policy (and all other variables are held at their median)
the predicted probability of Statei legislating in the same policy area is 1.4%. This
increases to 1.6% with a constitutional ruling by the Supreme Court. Although the
increase is only a fraction of a percent, it is a 14.3% change which is substantively
interesting.
17

Because federal litigation is relatively rare, data scarcity undercuts the utility of evaluating these
two policy areas separately. Nevertheless, while estimates from modeling abortion and election law
policies separately are less precise, some of the same types of patterns emerge as in the pooled
analysis discussed here.
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Figure 4.2: Adoption Model, Abortion and Election Law: Probit regression
estimates of the effect of various types of federal court treatment and a range
of control variables on Statei ’s decision of whether to adopt a policy similar
to Statej . Dots and diamonds indicate point estimates. Bars indicate 95%
confidence intervals. Diamonds (instead of dots) and bars in red denote that
a coefficient has a p-value less than 0.05. The full regression table is presented
in the Appendix.

Results from the control variables shed light on other factors which influence
states’ decisions about whether to adopt legislation in a policy area with federal
implications. Perhaps most notably, the often observed neighbor effect plays a role.
Statei is more likely to adopt a policy previously adopted by Statej when the two
states are neighbors. This effect emerges even after controlling for whether the two
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states are in the same federal circuit, any rulings handed down by the circuit courts,
and ideological and demographic similarities between the two states.
Statei ’s decision to adopt is also influenced by the ideology of the state government, whether it is an election year, its per capita income relative to that of Statej ,
the age of Statej ’s policy, and whether the policy in question relates to the regulation
of abortion. Adoption of a policy is less likely when the state government is more
liberal, it is an election year for Statei , or the policy is an abortion policy. Statei is
also less likely to adopt Statej ’s policy when the preexisting policy is older. Finally,
as the per capita income ratio between Statei and Statej gets larger, the probability
of adoption decreases. In other words, as Statei is increasingly richer than Statej ,
the likelihood Statei will adopt the policy of Statej decreases.
Even when Statei chooses to adopt legislation in the same policy area as Statej ,
there is variation in the level of similarity between those two policies. Consequently, I
go beyond the adoption decision to model the extent to which the text in Statei ’s policy overlaps the text in Statej ’s preexisting policy. While this variable only measures
one specific type of similarity, it represents an important step towards more extensive
evaluation of policy content. The results of this model for abortion and election law
policies are set forth in Figure 4.3.
As with the decision to adopt, constitutional rulings by the Supreme Court have
a positive effect on the extent to which the text of P olicyi overlaps with the text of
P olicyj . However, the effect does not quite reach statistical significance. Circuit court
rulings that P olicyj is unconstitutional can also effect the way states craft legislation.
When Statei and Statej are in different circuits, a circuit ruling that P olicyj is
unconstitutional significantly decreases the amount of policy overlap.18 Four percent
18

Although this finding is consistent with my hypothesis, there is no evidence that court rulings
from the same circuit have a more important impact as I also hypothesize. Most likely this is due
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Figure 4.3: Policy Overlap Model, Abortion and Election Law: Linear regression estimates of the effect of various types of federal court treatment and a
range of control variables on the percentage of the text of a policy adopted
by Statei which overlaps with the existing statute from Statej . Dots and
diamonds indicate point estimates. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Diamonds (instead of dots) and bars in red denote that a coefficient has a
p-value less than 0.05. The full regression table is presented in the Appendix.

less of Statei ’s policy overlaps the text of P olicyj . When all variables are held at their
median or mode (as applicable), the model predicts that 10% of Statei ’s policy will
to the small amount of available data rather than the absence of such effect. Statei only has circuit
court rulings from its own circuit to consider in a handful of cases.
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match phrases from P olicyj . A ruling of unconstitutionality from a different circuit
results in a roughly 40% reduction in the amount of borrowed text.
Many of the control variables are not statistically significant in the policy content
model. Most notably, there is no evidence that the status of Statei and Statej as
neighbors has an impact on the extent to which Statei borrows language from the
text of Statej ’s policy. The only control variables which do have an impact are the
length of the respective statutes and the policy type. Statei borrows more text for
abortion-related polices than for voter qualification statutes. Also, as expected, the
more text that is available in P olicyj , the larger the percentage of Statei ’s policy
which is drawn from that source. Conversely, when Statei ’s policy is more brief, a
smaller percentage is borrowed from Statej ’s preexisting statute.
Federal courts can only be expected to play a role in the diffusion of state policies
which have potential federal constitutional implications. To highlight this point, I
briefly present and discuss models of adoption and policy overlap for a policy area
traditionally left exclusively to the states, family law. The model results for policies
outlining the grounds for obtaining a divorce are presented in Figures 4.4 and 4.5.
Since, as expected, there are no federal court rulings on the constitutionality of any
of the policies in these data, the federal court ruling variables are not included. There
is no theoretical reason to expect that Statei and Statej being located in the same
federal circuit would influence either adoption or the content of a policy, and there is
no evidence of such a pattern.
Interestingly, the Neighbor variable has no statistically significant effect on the
adoption of a family law policy, but it does have a significant negative effect on the
extent to which an adopted policy overlaps with the text of P olicyj . When Statei
and Statej are neighbors, Statei borrows about 2% less text from Statej than when
the two states are not neighbors. This effect is all the more notable because it is the
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Figure 4.4: Adoption Model, Family Law: Probit regression estimates of the
effect of Statei and Statej being in the same circuit and a range of control
variables on Statei ’s decision of whether to adopt a policy similar to Statej .
Dots and diamonds indicate point estimates. Bars indicate 95% confidence
intervals. Diamonds (instead of dots) and bars in red denote that a coefficient
has a p-value less than 0.05. The full regression table is presented in the
Appendix.

only significant variable in the policy overlap model other than the length of Statej ’s
policy and Statei ’s per capita income. The adoption model provides a few more
insights. As with state policies which have federal implications, adoption is less likely
in election years. However, states are more likely to adopt when P olicyj is older.
Less populous states and states with a higher level of legislative professionalism are
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Figure 4.5: Policy Overlap Model, Family Law: Linear regression estimates of
the effect of Statei and Statej being in the same circuit and a range of control
variables on the percentage of the text of a policy adopted by Statei which
overlaps with the existing statute from Statej . Dots and diamonds indicate
point estimates. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. Diamonds (instead
of dots) and bars in red denote that a coefficient has a p-value less than 0.05.
The full regression table is presented in the Appendix.

less likely to adopt as are states which already have a preexisting statute of the same
policy type in effect.
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4.5

Discussion

This study provides evidence that federal courts influence state policy diffusion
for policies which have federal constitutional implications. While the U.S. Supreme
Court predictably plays an influential role, the results indicate that it is important
to account for the actions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals as well. Moreover, the
impact of these two different court levels is confined to different types of rulings. The
opinions of the Supreme Court which declare a state policy constitutional influence
the adoption and perhaps the content of other states’ policies, whereas circuit court
rulings from a different circuit striking down state policies as unconstitutional serve as
a warning to subsequent adopters to avoid similar statutory language. Although there
are theoretical reasons to expect the effects of constitutional and unconstitutional
rulings to be asymmetrical, the operation of each at a different level of the judicial
hierarchy is curious and suggests the need for further study.
The insights provided here about the role of federal courts in state policy diffusion
are made possible by relying on and further extending two important trends in the
field of policy diffusion research. The first is Shipan’s (2006) application of dyadic
analysis to the study of policy diffusion. The ability to model features of a previously
adopted policy opens up a host of interesting theoretical questions. The influence of
federal court treatment on how a policy affects other state’s legislative choices is only
one of many such questions. The second trend this chapter builds on is the burgeoning
attention to policy content. The results reveal that different factors appear to be at
work in choosing content than in the decision to adopt. While many familiar control
variables operate as expected in the adoption model, they shed comparatively little
light on the decision to borrow language directly from another state’s policy. This
indicates that further work is needed focusing on this aspect of policy formation
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to supplement what we know about the decision to adopt a policy. Traditionally
the difficulty and high cost of quantitatively analyzing the content of legislation has
created a substantial barrier. The increasing availability of computational methods
of text analysis is changing the landscape. The method employed here of calculating
the overlap between two policies can be easily deployed to study a range of questions
related to policy diffusion.
Being able to measure policy overlap is not just important to study decisions
about policy content separately from policy adoption. This measure is central to the
findings here because it gets directly at the underlying theoretical mechanism. When
the federal courts rule on a state policy, subsequent states which choose to enact a
similar policy take that decision into account. Borrowing text from policies which have
been upheld and avoiding use of text from those which have been struck down directly
reduces both cost and risks. The differential amount of overlap based on federal court
treatment indicates that state legislatures pay attention to federal courts and act
based on what they see. There is no other logical explanation for the observed patterns
of behavior. This chapter demonstrates that federal courts have some influence over
state policy diffusion and that measuring policy overlap combined with dyadic analysis
is a viable and vibrant new option for continued research exploring the mechanisms
behind policy diffusion.
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4.6

Appendix
Intercept
S.Ct. - Constitutional
S.Ct. - Unconstitutional
Same Cir. - Constitutional
Same Cir. - Unconstitutional
Diff. Cir. - Constitutional
Diff. Cir. - Unconstitutional
Same Circuit
Neighbor
Existing Statutei
Government Ideologyi
Government ID Difference
Legislative Professionalismi
Election Yeari
Populationi
Per Capita Incomei
Population Ratio
Per Capita Income Ratio
Age of Policyj
Abortion Policy
N

Coefficient
−0.437∗
0.056∗
0.021
−0.022
−0.204
0.028
−0.043
−0.020
0.070∗
−0.119
−0.004∗
−0.001
−0.530
−0.197∗
0.000
−0.008
0.001
−0.325∗
−0.005∗
−0.893∗

Standard Error p-value
0.184
0.017
0.019
0.003
0.031
0.489
0.143
0.877
0.112
0.069
0.042
0.498
0.029
0.140
0.021
0.329
0.022
0.001
0.078
0.127
0.002
0.014
0.001
0.428
0.403
0.188
0.067
0.003
0.000
0.606
0.039
0.844
0.001
0.182
0.132
0.014
0.002
0.007
0.078
0.000
146,412

Table 4.4: Adoption Model, Abortion and Election Law: Probit regression
estimates of the effect of various types of federal court treatment and a range
of control variables on Statei ’s decision of whether to adopt a policy similar
to Statej . The reported standard errors are robust standard errors which are
clustered on Statei and year t and * denotes a p-value less than 0.05.
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Coefficient
Intercept
0.060
S.Ct. - Constitutional
2.417
S.Ct. - Unconstitutional
−0.404
Same Cir. - Constitutional
5.028
Same Cir. - Unconstitutional
2.682
Diff. Cir. - Constitutional
−3.391
Diff. Cir. - Unconstitutional
−3.878∗
Same Circuit
1.444
Neighbor
0.182
Existing Statutei
−1.618
Government Ideologyi
−0.043
Government ID Difference
−0.009
Legislative Professionalismi
2.451
Election Yeari
−1.447
Populationi
−0.003
Per Capita Incomei
1.533
Population Ratio
0.159
Per Capita Income Ratio
2.614
Age of Policyj
−0.065
Word Counti
−3.019∗
Word Countj
4.587∗
Abortion Policy
4.781∗
N

Standard Error p-value
6.091
0.992
1.356
0.076
1.519
0.790
8.366
0.548
6.001
0.655
1.748
0.054
1.594
0.016
1.141
0.207
0.909
0.841
1.512
0.286
0.031
0.157
0.021
0.662
8.402
0.771
1.261
0.252
0.002
0.105
0.906
0.092
0.102
0.121
3.050
0.392
0.054
0.231
0.828
0.000
0.450
0.000
1.493
0.002
4,832

Table 4.5: Policy Overlap Model, Abortion and Election Law: Linear regression estimates of the effect of various types of federal court treatment and a
range of control variables on the percentage of the text of a policy adopted
by Statei which overlaps with the existing statute from Statej . The reported
standard errors are robust standard errors which are clustered on Statei and
year t and * denotes a p-value less than 0.05.
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Intercept
Same Circuit
Neighbor
Existing Statutei
Government Ideologyi
Government ID Difference
Legislative Professionalismi
Election Yeari
Populationi
Per Capita Incomei
Population Ratio
Per Capita Income Ratio
Age of Policyj
N

Coefficient
−1.582∗
0.001
−0.010
−0.513∗
0.001
−0.002
−2.334∗
−0.316∗
0.001∗
0.128
0.000
0.051
0.002∗

Standard Error p-value
0.356
0.000
0.049
0.985
0.043
0.820
0.166
0.002
0.003
0.682
0.001
0.119
0.931
0.012
0.141
0.025
0.000
0.000
0.093
0.172
0.001
0.840
0.241
0.832
0.001
0.029
28,861

Table 4.6: Adoption Model, Family Law: Probit regression estimates of the
effect of Statei and Statej being in the same circuit and a range of control
variables on Statei ’s decision of whether to adopt a policy similar to Statej .
The reported standard errors are robust standard errors which are clustered
on Statei and year t and * denotes a p-value less than 0.05.
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Intercept
Same Circuit
Neighbor
Existing Statutei
Government Ideologyi
Government ID Difference
Legislative Professionalismi
Election Yeari
Populationi
Per Capita Incomei
Population Ratio
Per Capita Income Ratio
Age of Policyj
Word Counti
Word Countj
N

Coefficient
−12.517
1.293
−2.219∗
1.563
0.037
−0.004
1.211
0.800
0.000
−2.435∗
−0.072
2.351
0.070
−0.382
4.022∗

Standard Error p-value
7.233
0.090
1.516
0.398
0.882
0.015
1.694
0.360
0.028
0.181
0.020
0.843
5.824
0.836
1.144
0.487
0.001
0.796
1.176
0.044
0.045
0.115
1.950
0.234
0.041
0.094
1.031
0.712
0.573
0.000
1,433

Table 4.7: Policy Overlap Model, Family Law: Linear regression estimates of
the effect of Statei and Statej being in the same circuit and a range of control
variables on the percentage of the text of a policy adopted by Statei which
overlaps with the existing statute from Statej . The reported standard errors
are robust standard errors which are clustered on Statei and year t and *
denotes a p-value less than 0.05.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion

This dissertation makes two kinds of contributions. First, the application of technologically advanced techniques for data-gathering and analysis illustrates how the
application of new tools can help shed light on old questions. Partially automating
data collection processes made it possible to amass data on a scale which would have
been impossible to achieve otherwise. Using existing tools in a new context allows
me to quantify important measures such as the similarity between two cases and the
percentage overlap between two statutes. The use of advanced technology also opened
up the ability to focus on the use of precedent within circuit courts, a task left largely
unexamined by scholars, most likely due to the difficulties involved.
This project illustrates how using advanced tools facilitates gaining substantive
insights, which is the second kind of contribution offered here. My novel datasets
have provided evidence of several key observations about the role of federal circuit
courts in legal development. In Chapter 2 I provide evidence that the legal doctrine
of stare decisis constrains judges’ decisions regarding which published circuit court
precedents to cite and which of the cited precedents should be treated negatively.
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Next, in Chapter 3 I turn to an examination of whether strategic anticipation of en
banc review helps explain when and why judges act in a constrained fashion. The
results of my empirical analysis indicate that circuit judges’ citation and treatment
decisions are sensitive to the ideology of the whole circuit. Finally, in Chapter 4 I shift
gears to examine the role of federal courts in state policy diffusion and provide some
preliminary indications that states consider federal court rulings both when deciding
whether to adopt a policy and when choosing the actual wording of new legislation.
The analyses in the forgoing chapters confirm both the importance of the U.S.
Courts of Appeals and the utility of exploring the content of court opinions and
legislation to investigate legal development. While such textual materials hold considerable promise for the continued examination of judicial politics, the sheer vastness
of available content poses challenges as well as opportunities. This is particularly true
in the context of the federal circuit courts which produce tens of thousands of published opinions every year. The datasets I compiled for this dissertation are only the
tip of the iceberg. The possibilities for future research will continue to expand as
technological tools and computational resources develop.
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